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DIVIDENDS, NONCONTRACTIBILITY, AND 
CORPORATE LAW 
William W. Bratton* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is the custom to hold out Warren Buffett and Berkshire 
Hathaway as a real world reproach to the arrogance of advocates 
of financial economic theory. I am in sympathy with this custom. 
But this Article will make no such reproach, even though it consid­
ers a practice of Buffett and Berkshire in the context of a body of 
financial economics . The subject practice is Berkshire's anomalous 
policy of paying no dividends . 1  The subject economic models, 
which will be collectively referred to as the "first principles variant 
of incomplete contracts theory," apply the theory of incomplete 
contracts to the problem of optimal capital structure. In so doing, 
these models create no occasion for a real world reproach. They 
show that financial economics, like Berkshire Hathaway itself, has 
grown and become more complex as the years have passed. Gone 
are the first-best certainties and simplifications characteristic of 
first-generation blockbusters like the capital asset pricing model, 
the efficient capital market hypothesis, and the irrelevance theory 
of capital structure. These second-generation exercises remit us to 
a second-best world-a world that, although highly stylized, would 
at least be recognizable to Benjamin Graham and David Dodd.2 
Some strong parallels to the first-generation economics of op­
timal capital structure nonetheless persist in this second-genera­
tion, second-best world .  Here, as there, debt solves certain 
governance problems attending equity control ,  and the issuance of 
equity in turn solves certain problems attending the incurrence of 
debt. But here, unlike there, conditions of uncertainty render un-
·· Professor of Law and Governor Woodrow Wilson Scholar. Rutgers School of Law­
Newark. My thanks  to Joe McCahery. David Carlson, and Dale Oesterle for their com­
ments on earlie r  drafts of th i s  paper. Special thanks to my research assistant.  Andrew 
\Vh ite. 
I Berkshire Hathaway h as paid only one dividend since Warren Buffe tt gained control 
ol it in 1965. That diviclencl was I 0¢ a -.hare distributed in 1967. Later Buffett said that "h e 
must have been in the bathroom·· when the Board made the declaration. See RoGER. Low­
E01STEIN . BuFFETT: THE iVI."-.KI>-:G OF ,\N A;viFR.ICAN C.A.PIT..\LIST 130. 133 n .•:• ( 1995). 
2 Benjami n  Grah am was Warren Buffett's mentor. See id. at 36-59. Graham 
coauthored a famous text on securi ty analysis wi th David Dodd. See genernllv BENJ.-\;..IJN 
GRAHA\1 ET AL.. SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES ,\NO TECHNIQUE (4th eel. 1962). 
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known and unknowable the precise and practical measure of the 
optimal mix of the two. The models described here reach this com­
mon-sensical result because they follow an economic theory of the 
firm that alters a number of assumptions made in first-generation 
economic models of agency relationships. The first-generation 
models remitted governance problems to corporate actors for con­
tractual solution, in many cases undaunted by the apparent ab­
sence of contractual technologies for dealing effectively with the 
problems they identified. They assumed, not unreasonably but 
perhaps not so safely, that suboptimal institutional conditions 
would create incentives to spur the development of new contrac­
tual solutions. And they deemed that the future would bring any 
necessary technical innovations, provided that no regulatory stum­
bling blocks cropped up to impede this progressive evolutionary 
process. 
In contrast, the incomplete contracts models suggest that in­
formation asymmetries-in particular problems of ex post observa­
tion and verification-structurally delimit the class subject matter 
suited to travel on this track of evolutionary improvement. This 
body of theory remits us to a second-best world for the purpose of 
identifying and explaining barriers that prevent the evolution of 
first-best corporate governance institutions. This does not negative 
the proposition that state intervention can be one such barrier.3 
But, at the same time , the state's removal of itself does not neces­
sarily free transacting actors to cause institutions to evolve to the 
first -best ideal. I t  instead holds, first , that transacting actors can 
work such marketplace magic only to the extent that their subject 
matter is contractible. Second, it holds that contractibility cannot 
safely be assumed-the requisite transactional technologies may 
not yet exist; nor may they even be imaginable in the present state 
of things . And, third, it holds that corporate capital structure 
presents many such problems of noncontractibility. It accordingly 
predicts that the mandatory and contractual devices that vest and 
transfer corporate control will continue to constitute the central 
governance institution. By default, then, state intervention retains 
a place on this theory's list of possible means to the end of improv­
ing suboptimal governance conditions.4 
3 For th is  view of h is tory. see MARK J. RoE. STRONG MANAGERS. WEAK OvmERs: 
THE PouTIC";\L RooTs OF AiYIERICAN CoRPORATE fiNANCE (1994). 
4 Sec Phi l ippe Aghion & Benj amin Herma l in ,  Legal Resrricrions on Privaic Conrracts 
Con Enhance Efficiency. 6 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 381 ( 1 990'1 . 
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Thus postured, these incomplete contracts models offer no 
present template for an optimal real world governance regime even 
though they direct themselves to the business of articulating formu­
lae for optimal capital structures . To bring them to bear on divi­
dend and reinves tment  p o lic y ,  then ,  p romises  n o  wea l th  
maximizing quick fix-contractual ,  mandatory, o r  otherwise. A 
pair of more limited objectives must suffice for this Article. First, 
the models wil l  be used here to explain why dividend and reinvest­
ment policy has a history of chronic insusceptibility to easy regula­
tory improvement-contractual, mandatory, or otherwise .  Second, 
the models will be used to appraise the three items on the standing 
menu of governance reform proposals respecting dividend and re­
investment policy-specifically, mandatory payout of earnings, in­
stitu t iona l  inves tor  m onitoring,  and s tepped-up disc losure 
requirements. 
This Article has three parts. Part I examines the dividend pol­
icy both of Berkshire Hathaway and of the companies in which it 
presently holds substantial common stock investments. It there 
turns out that the apparent puzzle presented by Berkshire's prac­
tice of total earnings retention is quickly solved with a reference to 
Graham and Dodd's classic work on security analysis . But it also 
turns out that Berkshire holds sign ificant blocks of stock in firms 
that follow a more conventional payout pattern. A puzzle is en­
countered at that point, but not a puzzle usually connected to 
Berkshire Hathaway. It  is instead the famous dividend puzzle of 
financia l  economics ,  along with the agency explanation favored in 
legal theory . 
Part I I  describes the approach to capital structure emerging in 
the incomplete contracts literature . The models teach, first ,  that 
intractable informational asymmetries prevent direct contractual 
solutions to the governance problem presented by dividend policy, 
and, second, that solutions can be structured only indirectly 
through the control transfer provisions built into corporate capital 
structures . This story echoes that of the standing agency explana­
tion of dividend policy, remitting attention to the disciplinary 
properties of debt for a means to counter the empire-bui lding ten­
dencies of corporate managers. Unlike the agency explanation, 
this story does not purport to offer a complete solution to the prob­
lem of suboptimal earnings retention. It does, however, provide a 
powerful explanation for the continuing absence of a firs t-best so­
lution. Given conditions of uncertainty, it follows from the nature 
412 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol .  1 9:409 
of debt and equity that the precise measure of an optimal mix of 
two will remain unknown. 
Part I I I  uses the incomplete contracts perspective to appraise 
three legal strategies for ameliorating the problem of suboptimal 
dividend and reinvestment policy. First ,  the recent proposal of a 
mandatory shareholder option to require payout of a pro rata 
share of earnings is examined.5 Incomplete contracts ideas expbin 
this s trategy's intuitive appeal while simultaneously warning of sig­
nificant perverse effects. Second, the indirect solution to the prob­
l e m  promised by the  proponents  of ins t i tu t iona l  inves tor  
activism-high-intensity boardroom monitoring by  genuinely in­
dependent directors, is considered.6 Although this strategy proves 
consonant with the incomplete contracts description of the firm, it 
remains hobbled by the problem of real world feasibility. The third 
strategy is stepped-up disclosure-a mandate to management to 
describe particulars respecting dividend and reinvestment deci­
sions .7  Here, the incomplete contracts literature sends an equivo­
cal signal. It supports no prediction that management would 
respond to such a mandate with credible reports. But it also im­
plies that revised disclosure rules should not be dismissed out of 
hand. Although cheap talk has a low value, that value still m ay 
suffice to make a disclosure mandate cost beneficial. 
l. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY AND THE DIVIDEND PUZZLE 
A. The Berkshire Hathaway Anomaly 
Most large , mature American corporations maintain a low but 
steady dividend payout . Berkshire Hathaway's policy of paying no 
dividends thus sets it apart. But this anomaly readily can be ex­
plained. It results from the coincidence of Mr. Warren Buffett 's  
personal preferences and his views on management policy. On the 
personal side, Buffett has derived life long satisfaction from weal th  
accumulation.S On the policy side , Buffett respects the bottom line 
rule respecting the reinvestment of earnings enunciated in corpo­
rate finance textbooks. Buffett has enunciated it himself: 
5 Sere Zohar Goshen. Shareholder Dividend Op1ions. 104 Y'\LE L.J. 88!. 903-06 (! 995 ) . 
r, See inji·a text accompanying notes 141-62. 
7 See Victor A. B rudney, Dividends, Discrelion, and Disclosure. 66 Vr\. L. R1·:v. 8.) 
(I 080): Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph E. Stiglitz. Discouraging Rivals: i'vlanagerial Rem-Seeking 
und Economic Inefficiencies. 85 A�i. EcoN. REv. 1301 (1095). Bw see Daniel R. Fischel. 
Tile Lmr and Econo111ics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699 ( 1 Y8l ). 
:-; See Lmn:NSTEIN, supra note l, at 10. 22. 87-88. 
' 1 
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Unrestricted earnings should be retained only when there is a 
reasonable prospect-backed preferably by historical evidence 
or, when appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future­
that for every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dol­
lar of market will be created for owners. This will happen only if 
the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or 
above, those generally available to investors.9 
413 
Restating the point, corporate cash flows should be reinvested only 
if management has a project that promises a rate of return r greater 
than the cost of its equity capital k. to 
The interest of the present case lies in the fact that Berkshire 
pays no dividends even as Buffett intones the textbook truth with 
complete plausibility. Buffett legitimately can preach this sermon 
despite his payout record because he has been the corporate com­
munity's premier reinvestor of earnings during the thirty years 
since Berkshire last mailed its shareholders a check. 11 He also is 
one of the few prominent investment managers ever to l iquidate an 
investment company in a bull market on the ground that advancing 
prices had eliminated the set of attractive opportunities . 12 So when 
Buffett talks reinvestment policy,  the talk is not as cheap as usual .13 
His track record amounts to a plausible reputational bond. 
Although an empire builder, he also cares about his record for 
making investments with outstanding yields, and, when given the 
choice , demonstrably prefers to enhance his reputation for yields. 
'.! Lawrence A .  Cunningham. Compilat ion .  Tlze Essavs of Warren Buffeil: Lessons for 
Corporare America. 19 C\Roozo L. REv. l .  124 (1997) [here inafter Buffer! Essays}. 
1° For a textbook rendi t ion o f  thi s  point .  see VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLf,\\·I W. B RAT· 
TON. CoRPORATE FINA'lCE: CAsEs AND MATERit\LS 548-49 (4th eel. 1993). It is noted that  
both Bu ffett and Charles Munger object to the text's associat ion of  the i r  opportuni ty cost 
rule of thumb for earnings retent ion with the financial  economic concept o f  cost of  capital. 
They object to the invocat ion of  the lat ter concept on the ground t ha t  i t  is not subject to 
empirical verificat ion .  See Lawrence A. Cunn ingham. E ditor.  Conversariom ji·o111 rhe War­
ren Bufferr Symposiu111. 19 CARDozo L. REv . 7 1 9. 769-75 (1997) [here inafter Buffeu 
Con verso rions J. 
I I See supra n ote I. 
12 That was the original  Bu ffett Pmtnership. a pr ivate i nvestment company managed by 
Buffet t  and li qu idated in 1969. See LowENSTiciN. supm note J.  at 11-1-15. The re cent d isso­
lutions of some well-known hedge funds presen t  a contemporarv variation on the theme. 
Se!' Laura Jereski. Od1·ssn Dissoh·es 53 Billion Finn: Big Hedge-Fund Era Aiuv Be over. 
'vV.\LL S 1 .  J . . Jan. l3. 1997. at B-1. 
1 3 All the samt�. some of Buffett's less successful i nvestments-LiSAir and Champion 
International. made in i9f\9 contemporaneously wi th  a successful i nvestmen t in  Gi l let te­
have been accounted for as resulting iargelv from the fact that B erksh ire had cash to i n ­
vest .  S a  LowE'-!STFI�;. supro note ! , a t  .15-1-55. 
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Thus, his preferences largely coincide with those of his outside 
investors . 14 
So far, then, Berkshire presents an anomalous pattern of divi­
dend and reinvestment, but no dividend "puzzle." Perhaps a puz­
zle will emerge upon the comparison of Berkshire 's corporate level 
policy of total retention with its corporate level treatment of the 
payout patterns of subsidiary companies .  With the subsidiaries ,  
Buffett has been said to  do a complete volte face. The story i s  that, 
as hard as nails , he resolves all doubts in favor of low levels of 
earnings retention ,  and insists that all available subsidiary cash 
flows be forwarded to the parent company's coffers. Following a 
practice that started when he took over Berkshire 's textile mil l ,  he 
keeps a sharp eye on every capital outlay in his empire, right down 
to the office pencil sharpener.15 
But, assuming that there is an element of truth to this story, 
we once again need look no further than the Graham and Dodd 
textbook16 for an explanation. Graham and Dodd counseled that 
growth stocks should be valued based on earnings alone, but that 
with low-growth and declining companies, both dividends and 
earnings should be considered. More specifically, they recom­
mended that below average shares in declining companies should 
be valued in accordance with a formula that accords four times the 
weight to a dollar paid out as a dividend than the weight accorded 
to a dollar retained in the business :  
Value = Multiplier (Expected Dividend + 113 Expected 
Earnings) 17 
Shares of the large group of low-growth companies falling in be­
tween growth companies and declining companies should be val­
ued, said Graham and Dodd, on an intermediate basis, somewhere 
between the 1 to 1 ratio for growth companies and the 4 to 1 ratio 
14 If the dividend payment pattern prevailing in other companies evolved into a stan­
dard practice as a check against management's tendency toward slack investment practice. 
then it is easy to assume that an exception would be carved out for Buffett. See infi'o text 
accompanying notes 37-41. 
15 See LuwF:NSTEIN. supra note L at 136-37. Buffett takes issue with the extension of 
this description to today's Berkshire. He tells us that where Berkshire controls a subsidi­
ary. but a minority block of stock remains outstanding. the dividend decision is left to those 
minority shareholders. Sec Buffcrr Conversorions. supra note 10. at 769-75. However. an 
inference or an alignment or interests in a high payout rate still arises. 
lh See GR!\I-IAM ET AL. supra note 2. 
'7 !d. at 5 13. The formula nu1kes it look as if a declining company can retain up to one­
third of its earnings without impairing shareholder value. but the appearance is deceiving. 
All other things being equaL the higher the pavout. the higher the value. 
1997] DIVIDENDS 415 
for decliners . 1 8  Presumably, one would adjust the formula for such 
an intermediate company after an appraisal of the capital needed 
to keep its operation up, running, and competitive in its established 
market. Or, to draw again on Buffett: 
In many businesses-particularly those that have high asset/ 
profit ratios-inflation causes some or all of the reported earn­
ings to become ersatz. The ersatz portion-let's call these earn­
ings "restricted"-cannot, if the business is to retain its 
economic position, be distributed as dividends. Were these 
earning� to be paid out, the business would lose ground in one 
or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its unit 
volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its financial 
strength. 19 
I f  the variegated portfolio of going concerns accumulated 
within Berkshire Hathaway now is examined, any puzzle respecting 
Berkshire's policy of high internal dividends is quickly solved. 
Berkshire collects established, well-managed businesses with se­
cure positions in stable markets-toll booths in the ordinary path 
of the average consumer, like local newspapers without competi­
tors and local retailers with successful formulas and large market 
shares.20 These revenue spinners need to be fed diets of "re­
stricted" earnings so that they can maintain their franchises, but 
that is all . The remaining cash flows are released to the parent. 
There Buffett continues the hunt for new investments in like-posi­
tioned money spinners. 
A meaningful survey of Berkshire's dividend and reinvestment 
policy must include a third cl ass of dividend and reinvestment deci­
sions. These decisions are made by the public companies in which 
Berkshire holds large equity blocks and often takes a seat on the 
board-the famous group of Amex, Cap Cities (now Disney), 
Coke, Gillette, Sally, and Wells Fargo. This Article's Appendix 
sets out data respecting the dividend payout ratio for each of these 
companies,  comparing its recent practice to those of its industry 
group . In some cases the Berkshire-held company pays out slightly 
more than its industry average, in some cases slightly less, and in 
some cases about the same . The numbers show at a min imum that 
Buffett does not use his influence in these boardrooms to effect 
dividend policies replicating those he has been said to deem sound 
1x 5)ee id. at 5 1 6- 1 8. 
I<J Bu/ft'U Essu1·s. supm nolc 9. at 123. 
21l See LowENSTEIN. supra note L at 41 1 -14. 
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in a wholly-owned subsidiaryY But once again we find an easy 
explanation. Buffett, unlike Benjamin Graham,22 taught himself to 
invest in growth situations. The above stocks are Berkshire 's long­
term growth plays. Given a genuine growth situation, we have al­
ready seen that even Graham and Dodd recommend that the divi­
dend payout be disregarded. 
But here we finally do encounter a puzzle. Why do firms mak­
ing up the charmed circle of Buffett's long-term holds pay any divi­
dends at all , given that no less an authority than Benjamin Graham 
said they do not have to, and that even a corporate stockholder like 
Berkshire has to pay a little federal income tax on receipt of the 
payment?23 Buffett himself seems untroubled by such a dividend 
payout practice , despite its apparent suboptimality. He even ap­
pears to endorse the conventional corporate payout pattern ob­
served by Lintner24 long ago. Says Buffett: 
Shareholders of public corporations understandably prefer that 
dividends be consistent and predictable. Payments, therefore, 
should reflect long-term expectations for both earnings and re­
turns on incremental capital. Since the long-term corporate out­
look changes only infrequently, dividend patterns should change 
no more often.25 
Here then is a puzzle for solution: Why, assuming that r > k for 
reinvested sums and an available amount of r > k investments 
greater than the amount of earnings retained ,  should a firm's divi­
dend payout policy accord with Buffett's description? 
B .  The Dividend Puzzle and the Agency Solution 
Large American corporations shape their dividend policy to 
accord with a conventional wisdom. Under this, the payout level 
should be set as a fixed amount rather than as a fixed percentage of 
earnings yielding a fluctuating amount. Increases should be ap­
proved only once the new, higher payout level clearly can be sus­
tained against negative shocks to corporate cash fiow.26 In the 
21 Or. if he attempts to use his inAuence. he does not succeed in persuading these firms 
to change their policies. 
22 See LowENSTEIN. supra note 1. at 201. 
23 See I.R.C. * 243(a) (West 1997) (allowing corporations to deduct 70°/c, or 100% of 
c!iviclends received. depending on the extent of ownership interest in the payor firm). 
24 See John Lintner. Dis1ribu1ion of lnco111es of Corpor{f[ions Al/long Dividends, !<.e­
tained Eamings. and Taxes. 46 Ai\I. Eco:--�. Rev. 97 (1956). 
25 Buff'e/1 Essavs. supro note 9. at 127. 
26 Empirical confirmation is set out in Lintner. supm note 24. For a recent reconf1rrna­
tion of the value of Lintner's model in understanding stock price behavior. see Hyun Mo 
Sung & Jorge L. Urrutia. Long- Term and Shorr- Term Causal Relarions Benvecn Dividends 
, 
1 
� I 
1 i 
i 
i 
! 
i 
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event of such a shock, the firm should ( if possible) borrow to main­
tain the dividend until relief comes in the form of a cyclical recov­
ery. A second conventional wisdom about dividends prevails in 
American textbooks on finance. As noted above, corporate cash 
flows should be reinvested only if management has a project that 
promises a rate of return r greater than the cost of its equity capital 
k. Absent such a project, management should pay out earnings as 
dividends, or, in the alternative, devote earnings to repurchases of 
the corporation 's shares .  These two conventional wisdoms have 
not synchronized well in practice . The first has synchronized even 
less well with the basic precepts of financial economics . The divi­
dend puzzle arises from this dissonance. 
Financial economics holds at its theoretical base point that div­
idend policy is irrelevant, at least in a taxless world .  This is the 
famous l.Vlodigliani-Miller proposition: So long as r > k respecting 
all corporate investments, capital is just  as well held in the firm as 
paid out as a dividend; shareholders desiring periodic cash returns 
can make their own dividends by l iquidating a portion of their 
stockholdingY However, relaxing the assumption of a taxless 
world causes the prediction to change. Given the Internal Reve­
nue Code, we should see a pronounced bias against dividends be­
cause they are taxable at ordinary income rates ,  where retained 
earnings import a tax deferral and a downward shift to capital gains 
rates. Assuming r > k investments, then, a dividend injures a tax­
paying shareholder. The prescription changes slightly for firms 
with free cash flow-that is ,  internally generated cash in excess of 
the cost of the set of r > k investments. These monies should be 
paid out of the firm, but the taxpaying shareholder with a long­
term holding perspective will prefer a share repurchase program to 
a dividend. Combining these points yields a rule of thumb respect­
ing sources of capital for new r > k investments. The first choice i s  
retained earnings, since they carry the lowest transaction costs , and 
retention avoids the taxable event of a dividend payment. The sec­
ond choice is debt, since interest payments can be deducted as a 
business expense. New equity comes in last.2i) 
Despite this analysis ,  managers follow the convention of pay·· 
ing steady dividends. They perceive that any departure from this 
und Srock Prices: A Tesr of Linlner"s Dividend ;\llodel and rlze Prescnl Value /Vlodel ofSwck 
Prices. J8 J. fiN. REs. 171 (1995). 
27 Sec Menon H. Miller & Franco Modigliani. Dividend Policy, Grow1!z. and !lzr> Valua­
lion of Shares. 34 J. Bus. 411 ( 1961). 
:>.x For a theoretical model of this '·pecking order'' proposition. sec Stewart C. iV!yers. 
Tlze Capita! s·rruuur!' Puzzle. 39 J. FIN. 575 (1984). 
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practice would go against shareholder preferences with destabi­
lizing results , even a departure occasioned by an especially good 
investment opportunity. And one of the better-established empiri­
cal propositions in financial economics offers them indirect sup­
port : Stock prices go up when firms announce dividend increases 
and decline when they announce reductions .29 The dividend puzzle 
lies in the tension between the practice of steady payout and the 
theoretical instruction that payout policy should yield to good in­
vestment opportunities .30 
Financial economists have endeavored for three decades to 
provide rational explanations for the payout practice , thereby solv­
ing the puzzle. Two leading (and rival) schools of explanation have 
arisen, and , like conventional dividend policy i tself, have persisted. 
According to one line of thinking, the "signalling" explanation, div­
idends ameliorate information asymmetries-firms pay them to 
signal private information about firm profitability.31 According to 
the other, "agency" explanation, stable dividend policy p al liates 
management's tendency to reinvest free cash flows in suboptimal r 
< k investments.32 Advocates of both explanations can point to 
supportive empirical studies .33 Meanwhile, corporate law com-
2<J B. Douglas Bernheim & Adam Wantz, A Tax-Based Tesr of the D ividend Signalling 
Hvpothesis. 85 Arv1. EcoN. REv. 532. 532-33 (1990),  collects the citation>. For recent recon­
firmation. sec Sung & Urrutia. supra note 26, at 179-85. 
30 See Fischer Black. The Dividend Puzzle, 1. PoRTFOLIO MGi\!T ..  Winter 1976. at 5. 
Strange things happen in consequence. Firms routinely raise outside capital for r > k in­
vestments in the same period in which they pay out cheaper investment capital to their 
shareholders. See Frank H. Easterbrook. Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends. 74 
Arvt. EcoN. REv. 650. 650-51 (i984).  For signalling models that encompass simultaneous 
divideml payment and outside financing, see, for example. Merton H. Miller & Kevin 
Rock. Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric lnformarion, 40 J. FtN. 1031 (1985) :  Joseph Wil­
liams. Efficient Signalling wirh Dividends, lnvesrmem. and Srock Repurchases. 43 J. FtN. 737 
r 1 988). 
31 See. e.g .. Kose John & Joseph Williams. Dividends, Dilution. and Taxes: A Signalling 
Equilibrium, 40 J. FtN. 1 053 ( 1985 ) ;  Miller & Rock, supra note 30. at 1031: Sudipto Bhatta­
charya. Imperfect Information, Dividend Poiicy, and "The Bird in !-land" Fallacy. 10 BELL 
J. Ecoi". 259 (l979). 
32 The leading description of this problem is Michael C. Jensen. J\gency Costs of Free 
Cash FlrJiV. Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 76 A1-.1. EcoN. REv . .3.23 ( l986) [hereinafter 
Jensen. Agency Cosrs]. ·me idea's origins can be traced to precedent legal literature. how­
ever. See Victor Brudney. Dividends. Discre!ion. and Disclosure . 66 V.-\. L. REv. 85. 95-97 
( !980). -me subsequent agency description does not improve on Brudncy's clingnosis of 
:he problem in any fundamental way. 
33 Many studies are inclusive because empirical demonstrations of stock price re­
sponses to dividend announcements admit to both interpretations. Sec Bernheim & 
\\'antz. supra note 29. at 533. Bernheim and Wantz claim that their study breaks the 
logjam in iavor of the signalling hypothesis. They assert that if the signalling hvpothesis is 
correct. abnormal returns will be more sensitive to the magnitude or announced dividend 
changes when observable factors such as tax rates. bond ratings. and capilcity utilization 
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mentators, steeped in the problem of the separation of ownership 
and control ,  have found the agency explanation more persuasive .34 
The signalling models tend to assume that dividends are chosen to 
maximize the total wealth of the firm's current shareholders,35 a 
significant infirmity from a legal point of view.36 
In the agency cost picture , managers have incentives to make 
suboptimal investments .  Such projects cause their empires to grow 
and may cause increases in their pecuniary compensation.37 Inter­
nally generated cash flows present an easy source of financing for 
such projects . They are the cheapest funds available , and also suit 
suggest that the margina l  cost of d ividends i s  high. If the agency hypothesis i s  correct th is  
wi l l  not be the  case .  Their  study empir ica l ly proves the assertion, strengthening the case 
for the signall ing hypothesis. See id. at  549. 
For a study supporting the agency hypothesis, consider Mahmoud A.  Moh'd e t  aL An 
Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship Between Agency Theory and D ividend Policy, 30 
F!N.  REv. 367 ( 1 995) .  This  is a t ime-series cross-sectional analysis of 341 firms for the 
period 1 972-89. The analysis presents a series of  i nteresting findings: ( 1) that  firms exper­
i encing or about to experience h igh rates of revenue growth tend to establ ish lower divi­
dend payouts: (2) that d ividend payout increases as a function of firm size (supporting the 
view that l arger firms have higher agency costs and smal ler firms have higher financing 
transaction costs) :  (3)  that dividend payout is inversely related to i ntrinsic business risk: (4) 
that firms establish a lower dividend payout as their operating and financial l everage mix 
increases (see infra text accompanying notes 39-40 (supporting Rozeffs view of  dividends 
as a quasi fixed charge)) ;  (5) that h igher d ividend payouts are observed when management 
holds a low percentage of shares and as outside ownership becomes more d ispersed: and 
(6) that firms tend to establish h igher payouts as inst i tut ional ownership i ncreases. See 
Moh 'd e t  aL supra, at 379-80. 
"4 1l1is may also fol low from the fact that  the s igna l l ing models rely heavi ly on mathe­
matical description. The agency l i terature tends to be more discursive . 
An outside reader of l i terature on both sides of this debate wonders why the partic i ­
pants  presuppose that one explanation must be adopted at  the expense of  the other. Sig­
n ificant ly, the theories have been deployed a long para l le l  l ines. For example,  they have 
been separately drawn on to explain that. despi te  the tax advantages of  share repurchases, 
the repurchases are not necessaril y  superior from the point of view of an outside i nvestor. 
Michael  J .  B rennan & Anjan V .  Thakor, Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy . 45 
J. F IN .  993 ( 1990), provides an asymmetric  in formation model that points out that nonpro­
portionate repurchases potenti a l ly transfer wealth from smal l  shareholders, who have no 
incent ive to become i nformed about m arket activity. to l arge shareholders. who do. Com­
pare Michael  J. Barclay & Cl ifford W. Smith .  Jr., Corporare Payow Policy: Cush Di l ·irlends 
versus Open-Marker Repurchases. 22 J. FIN. EcoN. 61. 65 ( 1 988) .  stressing that  manage­
ment discre tion to time repurchases d issipates any bonding effect. 
These two treatments might  well be compared with a third, which fol lows from the 
Graham and Dodd trad i t ion .  See LouiS LowENSTE IN.  SENSE ;\ND NoNSENSE IN Co RPO­
RATE FINANCE 144-76 ( 1 991 ) . 
35 See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole. A Th eory of Income and Dividend Snworlzing 
Based on Incumbency Rents. 1 03 J .  PoL. EcoN. 75. 78 ( 1 995) .  
y, ·n1e exception in the legal  l i terature i s  FischeL supra note 7. at  700. 708- 1 4. which 
unequivocal ly  rejects the agency explanation. pos i t ing that control market u isc ip l ine obvi­
ates any problem. Fischel also cites the signal l ing hypothesis 1vi th complete approval .  
-'7 See Michael C. Jensen.  Eclipse of rhe Public Corporation .  HARV. B us. REv. ,  Sept .­
Oct. J 989. a t  6L 66 [hereinafter Jensen. Eclipse] .  
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the risk averse manager's wariness of a stepped-up ratio of debt to 
equity.38 The convention of a steady dividend payout results in a 
check against this tendency toward suboptimal investment of inter­
nally generated capital. For every dollar pumped out as a dividend ,  
the investing manager has to  resort to outside capital markets for a 
new dollar. A convention of a steady payment stream thus forces 
ongoing reliance on outside financing.39 The dividend thus bonds 
the managers to act in the shareholders ' interest. Said Rozeff, the 
originator of this agency explanation , the resort to outside funding 
forces management to reduce agency costs and reveal information 
to actors in the capital markets .40 Easterbrook, restating and ex­
tending the theory, stressed the latter point-dividends " start up" 
monitoring by capital market actors who, unlike shareholders, are 
unhobbled by collective action problems .41 
The agency explanation solves the dividend puzzle ,  narrowly 
defined, by telling us why, despite a tax disadvantage, a share­
holder rationally might prefer one dollar to be paid out as a divi­
dend rather than reinvested in an r > k project. But, in so doing, it 
gives rise to a new question: If conventional payout policy has 
evolved as a solution to the agency problem bound up in manage­
ment discretion over investment and financing policy , why, despite 
widespread adherence to the steady payout convention,  have divi­
dend and reinvestment practices widely been perceived to be 
3K See Goshen. supm note 5. at  887-88. 
3<.J See E asterbrook. supra note 30; Michael S .  Rozeff, Growth. Beta and Agency Cosrs 
as Dererminams of D ividen d Favour R arios. 5 J. FIN. REs. 249 ( 1 982). 
4l l See Rozeff, supm note 39, a t  250. The bond, a l though reputational only .  does impact 
on man agement behavior. See Goshen. supra note 5. at  890-91 .  The empirical  studie� 
focus on fi rms in  fin ancial distress. and show that they tend to cut rather than el iminate 
their dividends. See H arry DeAngelo & Linda D eAngelo. Dividend Policy and Fin ancial 
Disrress: An Empirical ln vesrig ation of Troubled NYSE Firms. 45 J .  fiN. 14 15  ( 1 990): Al­
bert Eddy & B ruce Seifert.  Dividend Ch anges of Fin anciallv Weak Firms, 21 fiN. REv. 419  
( 1986). 
Rozeff. strictly fol lowing the original agency paradigm. also suggests that  dividend pol­
icy and insider ownership are substitute tools to reduce agency costs. with firms with high 
percentages of insider ownership paying smal l  d ividends. See Roze l  mpra note 39.  a t  25 1 .  
Subsequent empirical work negates this picture.  Diane K. Schooley & L. D wayne B arney. 
Jr. .  Using Dividend Policy and Man agerial 01vnership ro Reduce Agency Costs, 17 J .  f iN .  
Res. 3 6 3  ( 1 994). show t h a t  t h e  relation between the dividend payout ratio and m�mage­
ment ownership is nonmonotonic.  Beyond a certain point .  greater manage m e n t  ownership 
causes the dividend payment to rise . Schooley and B arney conclude that their results ac­
c'.>rd with the management ent rench ment  hypothesis of Randall Morek et a l . ,  ,"vf anagemenr 
01vnership and i'vl arf..:.et Valumion . 20 J.  FI!':. EcoN. 293 ( 1 988).  l 1 at is .  at some point 
increases i n  management stock ownership increase agency costs. 
-+I See E asterbrook. supra note 30. at 653. 655 .  H e  adds a point about man agement risk 
aversion-the need to replace internal flows may prompt le verage beneficial  t o  s harehold­
ers that  man agers otherwise would avoid incurring. See id. at  653-54. 
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suboptimal?42 The remainder of this Article draws on incomplete 
contracts models of corporate capital structure in an attempt to an­
swer this question. 
I I .  AGENCY COSTS , CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND 
N ONCONTRACTIBILITY 
TI1e following sections set out basic components of the incom­
plete contracts model of capital structure and then extend the 
model to dividend policy. This presentation requires some antece­
dent contextual grounding, provided in the first two subparts be­
low. The first shows how these models' assumptional framework 
differs from that of the earlier and better-known generation of in­
complete contracts models. The second shows how this framework 
has been brought to bear on the matter of optimal capital struc­
ture . The discussion-in-chief begins with the third subpart. 
A.  Alternative Approaches to Contractual Incompleteness­
Transaction Costs and First Principles 
Incomplete contracts models deal with the problems that arise 
when contracting parties possess less information than is necessary 
to approximate their first-best expected utility. Most work on in­
complete contracts falls into one of two basic paradigms: the origi­
nal transaction costs approach , and a newer, and contrasting, 
approach which derives incompleteness from first principles .  The 
transaction costs approach has been assimilated into the con­
tractarian theory of the firm of law and economics. The compo­
nent ideas of the first principles approach as of yet have shown up 
sporadically in legal commentaries .43 First principles models will 
be applied here . 
Under the transaction costs paradigm, costs prevent actors 
from writing complete ex ante contracts and contract-inhibiting 
costs continue to accumulate throughout a contract's life .  Costs in-
42 Goshen. supra note 5 ,  a t  887-88 nn .34-35. renews the denunciation but  cites studies 
dat ing from the 1 980s and earl ier. I t  is  unclear whether the problem persists in  the 1 990s 
with its former intensity. 
43 See, e.g., William W. Bratton et  al., Repeated Games, Social Norms, and Incomplete 
Corporare Conrracrs. in FAIRNESS AN D CoNTRACT 1 63 ,  1 66-71 ( Ch ristopher Willets ed . ,  
1 996):  Ol iver Hart .  An Economis!"s View of Fiduciary D wy.  43 U. ToRONTO L.J. 299 
( 1 993) :  O liver Hart .  A n  Economisr's Perspective on rhe Theory of the Firm , 89 CoLUM.  L. 
REv. 1 757 ( 1 989) :  Avery K atz. When Should an Offer Srick? The Economics of Promissory 
Eswppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 1 05 YALE L.J .  1 249. 1 278-79 (1 996); Alan Schwartz. 
Relational Contracts in rhe Courts: A n  A nalysis of Inco111plete Agreements and Judicial 
Strategies. 2 1  J. LEGAL STU D. 271 ,  272-73 ( 1 992).  
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curred by the time of execution and delivery amount to an initial 
investment. They result from the difficulty of anticipating and pro­
viding for all state contingencies respecting a transaction, whether 
because of their overwhelming number or because of the l arge in­
vestment required to underwrite the composition of, and to sup­
port the process of reaching agreement upon, specific regulations 
for each future state. After the contract 's execution and delivery, 
each step in the enforcement process, from verifying counterparty 
performance (or nonperformance) to invoking third party enforce­
ment mechanisms, entails additional costs. Ex ante projection of 
such enforcement costs shapes the choice of agreed upon terms, 
and, in an extreme case, causes an otherwise productive transaction 
to be foregone for lack of feasibility .44 
The transaction costs paradigm recognizes that contracting ac­
tors cannot be expected to negotiate complete ex ante solutions to 
all problems. It nevertheless advances the notion that the institu­
tion of ex ante contracting, broadly conceived,  self-sufficiently sup­
ports  effic ient  transact iona l  re l a t ionsh ips . It makes  three  
assertions toward this end. First ,  actors who risk capital can be  ex­
pected to design ex ante governance structures that minimize the 
costs of future uncertainty. Second, even though legal decision 
makers must assist the parties by filling in omitted terms ex post, 
those terms may be cast from an ex ante time perspective,  and, 
indeed, should be so cast in order to guard against disruption of the 
parties' allocation of financial risk and to minimize future transac­
tion costs.45 Third, comes a prediction. Given proper containment 
of the agencies of state intervention , transacting actors can be ex­
pected to devise technologies that lower the transaction costs that 
cause incompleteness, thereby expanding the effective zone of con­
tractual governance . 
The first principles paradigm of incomplete contracts begins 
with the transaction costs paradigm's diagnosis of the causes of 
contractual incompleteness. But i t  then brings the notion of in­
completeness to bear on a more precise conception of "contract . "  
Unlike the transaction costs approach, which tends to include any 
voluntary economic relation with in its notion of the ex ante con­
tract, the first principles approach restricts the reach of the ex ante 
contract to cases where actors make explicit specifications about 
the future. That is, to have "contract '' terms that govern future 
states, those contingent states must be specified and the future out-
44 See Bratton e t  a ! . . supra note 43. a t  l66-7 l .  
45 See id. 
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comes must be computable. S ince some future states of nature 
clearly are not computable, transacting parties as a result will lack 
the technology necessary to enable the negotiation and composi­
tion of a contract term ex ante .46 
The first principles paradigm also places a greater stress on the 
ex ante impact of ex post problems of performance and enforce­
ment than does the transaction costs approach. Thus, even where 
an ex ante computation is theoretically feasible , if a party' s  per­
formance of that computed future state will not be both observable 
by the counterparty and verifiable by the enforcing authority. ex 
ante agreement on that contract term will not be feasible.47 These 
three factors-computability, observability, and verifiability-in­
trinsically l imit the operation of the institution of the ex ante con­
tract .4c; Although each factor results in costs, to characterize the 
three as ' ' transaction costs" and nothing more trivializes the seri­
ousness of the productivity problems they cause . 
As applied to capital structure , the first principles framework 
asserts , first, that corporate contracts can be expected to omit im­
portant future variables due to the difficulty or impossibility of ex 
ante description or ex post observation and verification, and, sec­
ond, that given these points of noncontractibility, important out-
4A See Luca A nderl ini  & Leonardo Fel li, lncomplere Wriuen Con/racrs: Undescriboble 
Srmes of Narure .  1 09 Q.J. EcoN. 1 085 ( 1 994). 
47 For fun damental contributions to the literature making this poi n t ,  see Sanford Gross­
man & O l i ver Hart .  The Cosrs and Benefils of Ownership: A Theory of Venical and Lmeral 
!11 1egrmion . 94 J. PoL. EcoN. 69 1 ( 1 986) [hereinafter Grossman & Hart. Venica/ & Lo!erul 
fnregmrion ] :  O l iver Hart & John Moore. lncomple£e Coll /racls and Reneg01imion.  56 
E coNo:-.t ETR tCA 755 ( 1 988). 
4:-> Process i nt1rmities also limit the utility of contract. Even where parties could cost­
heneficially specify a contract term. in formation asymmetries and strategic behavior may 
preve n t  them from doin g  so. 'The first principles perspective insists that bargain ing 
processes often shape contractual results. and models the problems that come up when 
relational economic actors transact .  1l1is leads to the q uestion of whether a viable se t of 
governance provisions for a firm can be derived through any available model of contract. 
Some bargai ning models  show coordination failures. Rational actors can conceivably 
adopt any one of a n umber of mutually consist e n t  arrangemen t s  and mark e t  forces may fail 
to assure that only efficient pattern s emerge from the range of possibilities. Other models 
iclentifv costs of bargaining that preven t  e fficient results. Consider a price negotiation over 
t he sale of a nonfungible product.  A buyer seeking a greater sh are of the gains of t rade 
might invest in q uality information to gain a bargai ning advantage. Such an investment in  
a pure dis t r ibut iona l  advantage is  inefl icien t .  since on ly total  benefits and costs matter 
from an efliciency standpoint. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts. Bargaining Cosls. Influ­
ence Cosrs. one/ rl1 e  Orguni�arion of Economic A Ciivin· . in PERSPECTIVES o� PostTIVF 
PoLITtC.-\ L Eco:--J o;o. tY 72-77 ( James E. Alt  & Kenneth A .  Shepsle  eels .. 1 990). I n  the al ter­
native. each bmgaining party stands to benelit from the communication of in formation 
about i ts  own prefere nces. The resulting informational uncertain t y  can produce the loss of 
a bcncl1cial transaction. a n d  induces inefficien t informational i n vestment in any even t .  
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comes of necessity will be determined by the firm's structure of 
ownership. The specification of the owner and any associated con­
tingent control allocations built into the firm's contracts-in partic­
ular the contracts making up the capital structure-substitute for 
contract terms absent due to the condition of contractual incom­
pleteness .49 As the zone of noncontractible contingencies expands, 
the ownership specifications become more important because the 
firm's performance will depend on the incentives of its present and 
contingent future owners . Notably, ' 'owner" is here special ly de­
fined as the party who has the right to control all aspects of the 
asset that have not been given over to contractual specification ex 
ante.50 Under this definition, ownership and control cannot be sep­
arated ,  although they can be shared or transferred. Since asset 
control is ownership, residual claimants who do not manage are not 
owners , whatever the law's contemplation.5 1 
B .  Debt and the Maximization of Value 
Since dividend policy is irretrievably tied to investment and 
financing policy, economic theories of the dividend tend to be cor­
ollaries to theories of optimal capital structure .  The incomplete 
contracts models follow this pattern. 
The economic theory of capital structure has evolved as an ex­
tended response to the famous irrelevance hypothesis of Modi­
gliani and Miller. Under the Modigliani-Miller model ,  firm value 
stems entirely from the production function and is independent of 
capital structure .  Furthermore , the cost of capital is constant 
across all debt-equity ratios. Subsequent models relax the Modi­
gliani-Miller assumptions to show dependencies between capital 
structure and firm value . These variously emphasize debt's signal­
ling role,52 its role in facilitating monitoring,53 and its commitment 
4'l See Phil ippe Aghion & Patr ick Bo l ton . A n  !ncomplere Contracts Approach to Finan­
cial ComraCEing, 59 REv. EcoN. STUD. 473, 479 ( 1 992). 
5o See Grossman & Hart. Vertical & L(/{eral fmegrarion .  supra note 47, a t  695 . 
5 !  Tbey may have contingent r ights to take ownership, or to substitute one owner for 
another.  but so long as they passively receive a payment s tream. they are not owners .  
52 Sec Stewart C. M yers & Nicholas S. Maj luf. Corporare Financing and !nvestmellt 
Decisions When Firms Have Informarion Thar !nvesrors Do Nor Have, 1 3  J. F n" .  EcoN. 1 87 
( 1984 ) ; Stephen A. Ross. The Derenninarion of Financial Srrucwre: The Incentive-Signal­
ling Approach . 8 B ELL J. E coN. 23 ( 1 977 ) .  
5.3 Sec. e .g  . .  Douglas Ga le  & Mart in  Hel lwig. fncenrive- Colllparihle Debt  Contracts: The 
One-Period Problem . 52 REv. EcoN. STu o. 647 ( 1985) ;  Robert M. Townsend. Optimal 
Contracrs and Competirive !VIarkers with Cos!lv Slate Verification.  2 1  J. EcoN. THEOR Y 265 
( 1 979) .  
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value,5-+ in each case showing a connection between the firm's  debt/ 
equity mix and the value of its production function. With the inter­
polation of agency theory the models achieve a tie to management 
science . Not only is  there a theoretical optimal level of debt, but 
that level will tend to lie higher than the level indicated by the 
conventional wisdom prevailing among managers due to their pref­
erence for debt at comfortably low levels .55 
This agency analysis extends to dividend policy,  with subop­
timal earnings retention and suboptimal borrowing turning out to 
be two manifestations of the same agency problem. At its first ap­
pearance , agency theory also proposed a real world solution­
Michael Jensen's  famous model of a high-leverage firm controlled 
by a leveraged buy out association.56 This model asserted that the 
high level of debt attending an LBO bonds management to pay out 
free cash flow in the form of interest payments and makes it impos­
sible to reinvest in suboptimal projects. Additionally, the immedi­
ate threat of bankruptcy in the post-LBO period causes 
management incentives to be better aligned with those of outside 
investors . Given a heavy debt load and an equity stake, managers 
will perform like sole owners . This model, however, lost credibility 
due to indiscriminate employment in practice during the l atter part 
of the 1980s. 
Incomplete contracts models of optimal capital structure in 
the first principles mode revive the point that debt enhances value 
by control ling agency costs. But in so doing they interpolate a 
more complex concept of optimality. In earlier models, debt re­
duced agency costs subject only to the caveat that problems of 
overinvestment and underinvestment become prohibitively costly 
when debt reaches extraordinarily high levels.57 The incomplete 
contracts models look to debt' s  effects on management incentives 
across a wider range of decisionmaking scenarios and bring to bear 
a more extensive range of valuation variables. The problem for 
solution is not j ust "cost control" conceived in terms of a short list 
of types of  costs attending states of high debt. Optimal capital 
s t ructure here also concerns the degree of synchronization between 
the terms of the debt contract and both the character of the bor-
5-1 See Jensen. Agency Cosrs, supra note 32: Sanford J. Grossman & Ol iver D. H art. 
Corporore Financial Srrucwre and Managerial lncenrives, in THE EcoNOMICS OF INFORMA­
TION Ai':D U�CERTA ! NTY 1 08 - 1 0  (John J.  McCall eel.,  1 982) [hereinafter Grossman & H art. 
Corporure Financial Srruuure ]. 
55 See Jensen. Agency Costs, supra note 32. a t  323-25. 
5(,  See Jensen. Eclipse. supra note 37.  at 6 1 .  
57 For an overview. see B R U D N EY & BRAT!"ON . supra note 1 0 ,  at 475-77 . 
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rower's  asset base and its future sequence of business decisions. 
We get a multifaceted notion of optimality that focuses as much on 
the dangers of excess debt as on the agency costs of insufficient 
debt. 58 
A model of short-term debt devised by Oliver Hart provides a 
good introduction to the idea that a theory of optimal capital struc­
ture must take account of structural connections between the terms 
of the debt contract and particulars respecting the borrower's busi­
ness .59 This is a two period model that assumes complete informa­
tion. More particularly, investment occurs at t = 0 in a project 
conceived and managed by an entrepreneur E. The project will 
throw off cash flows yl and fy2 at t = 1 and t = 2, where t = 2 is the 
project termination date. The model assumes that the ultimate 
agency problem occurs at t = 2:  Specifically, E will be positioned to 
divert all  of fy2 to her own pocket. As  a result, if outside financing 
is to be feasible, provision must be made for complete payment to 
the outsider at t = 1 .  Short-term borrowing accordingly emerges as 
the only feasible vehicle .  
The model makes a number of  additional assumptions. E has 
all the bargaining power, and the outside investor I who lends the 
money can be held to a break-even return. In addition, E has a 
l imited amount of wealth w ,  with w < K, the cost of the proj ect. E 
must invest w in the project, borrowing at least  the difference be­
tween K and w, with the debt due in its entirety at t = 1 .  E,  having 
borrowed an amount B, can liquidate project assets in order to 
make the contractual payment P at t = 1 ;  f is the value of proj ect 
assets remaining after this liquidation. If E cannot make the pay­
ment, the firm is liquidated at t = 1 at value L ,  which goes to I. 
Thus, the amount I actually receives at t = 1 is equal to Min 
{P, L  } .6o 
50: Compare also in this regard the signi ficant differences between the treatment of 
bank ruptcy in the literature of the 1 980s with the treatment today. The agency cost models 
relied on the assertions that the threat of bankruptcy prompts better management per­
formance and that bankruptcy process amounts to a low-cost exercise in contract renegoti­
a t i o n .  See Jensen. Eclipse. supra note 37,  at 72; Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Cosrs: Some 
Evirlencl:' . 32 J. F IN .  337 ( 1 97 7 )  (direct costs of bankruptcy around five percent ) .  Today. the 
bankruptcy system i s  treated as a source of both significant transaction costs and perverse 
incent i\'es. Significantly. the economists responsible for the i ncom p le te contracting models 
of capital structure have taken a part in bankruptcy reform discussions. See Philippe 
Agh i o n  et  <ll . .  fnzoroving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.  849 ( 1 994) .  TI1eir  par­
t icipat ion amounts to an implicit recognition that institutional imperfections prevent their 
models' d i rect application in p ractice.  
5'> See OuvER H.-\RT. Fmi\-tS, CoNTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTUR E  1 0 1 -06 ( 1 995 ) .  
�>o See id. a t  1 03-05. 
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Investment Realization of yl 
K and l iquidation of (1 -f ) 
I I 
t = O  t =  l 
427 
Realization ofl\2 
and liquidation of project 
I I 
t = 2 
The model defines the parameters of both the class of feasible 
borrowing transactions and of the optimal debt contract. The 
leveraged project is feasible if: 1 )  L :2:: K - w ;  and 2)  E will receive 
by t = 2 an amount greater than her present wealth w. More partic­
ularly, assuming that E will have to liquidate some project assets to 
make P at t = 1 ,  the net present value of the project, yl + fy2 + (1 -
f)L must be greater than K. Given these parameters , it turns out 
the project may not be feasible at t = 0 even though its present 
value of yl + fy2 > K - w. Feasibility-borrowing capacity-de­
pends also on the value of L .  If K = 90, B = 60, P = 60, yl = 60, fy2 
= 70, and L = 30, the proj ect is worth 130 (discounted)  - 90, but 
will not be financed because its l iquidation value at t = 1 is only 50 
percent of the payment due, and E cannot make a credible com­
mitment to pay any part of fy2 over to I .  If we change the facts so 
that yl = 50 and L = 60, borrowing becomes feasible but subop­
timal. E is going to have to liquidate an amount 1 0  of the project's 
assets at t = 1 in order to make P, thereby reducing the base of 
assets in place necessary to produce the fy2 value of 70 .6 1 
The model allows for a range of optimal debt contracts . That 
is ,  so long as L :2:: B = P :2:: K - w, any amount borrowed is optimal .  
It thereby teaches relatively little about the properties of the opti­
mal debt transaction. But some enhancement of the model 's  heu­
ristic value results when it  is extended to cover multiple periods. 
Here the model starts with K, w ,  and B at t = 0 ,  and allows an 
indefinite number of periods to occur between t = 0 and project 
termination at date T. The project is assumed to yield an amount y 
in each one of these intermediate periods, and to possess a differ­
ent liquidation value L on each intervening date on which an 
amount y is realized. The project depreciates, so the value of L 
decreases progressively during the l ife of the project and L = 0 on 
the termination date T. The debt contract specifies that payments 
are due at each date between r = 0 and t = T, with the last payment 
due on t = T - 1 ,  the date immediately preceding T. 
The formal model of debt capacity that emerges with i n  these 
extended parameters echoes the conventional wisdom of a Graham 
6 1  See ir!. a t  I 05-06. 
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and Dodd bond analyst.62 Debt capacity is  stated as a function of 
the amounts and times of receipt of the flows y and the rate of 
depreciation of the project's liquidation value. Optimality turns on 
the relationship between these factors, the amount borrowed B ,  
and the contractual repayment path. Once again, the model allows 
for a continuum of optimal arrangements . Repayment may occur 
quickly over time, that is, E borrows as little as possible and repays 
as quickly as possible; repayment also may occur slowly over time, 
that is, E borrows as much as possible and pays back as slowly as 
possible.63 But some parameters emerge to narrow the range of 
equilibria .  First, fast repayment paths are facilitated by projects 
with front-loaded streams of y, and slow repayment paths are facil­
itated by longer lived, more durable assets .64 Second, a l arger 
amount w, or owner equity, can support a greater quantum of 
debt.65 Third, determination of the optimality of a given debt ar­
rangement depends not only on the amounts y and P but on oppor­
tunities for their reinvestment. If  either E or I has reinvestment 
opportunities superior to the project during the life of the proj ect, 
then wealth is enhanced to the extent that the project flows are 
directed to that party. For example, if the superior opportunities 
lie with E, while I reinvests at a market rate, then the optimal pay­
ment path is the s lowest-the differential between y and P is capi­
tal for reinvestment by E.66 
62 First. total B outstanding at any time cannot exceed the liquidation value L .  Second. 
total B, net of the sum invested in the project  plus the present value of  the cash flows 
produced by the proj ect, must be at least as large as the present value of  the debt repay­
ments.  Given the continued assumption that E has all the bargaining power and { must 
invest on a break-even basis. this implies the following expression, with Po standing for the 
stream of debt payments and Yo standing for the stream of  project cash flows: 
r r-1 
I P, ::0: (K-w; - I Y, for a l l  t = 1 . . . . . T. 
,�o 
For the first-best to be achieved: 
1-} 
K-w- I Y, ::; Ll for all t = l ,  . . . . T. 
r-,_1) 
See id. at 1 08. 
n3 See id. at  109- 10. If the depreciation comes quickly during the l i fe o f  the project  ancl 
the cash flows are encl loacled. E can borrow an additional amount to be put in a sa vings 
account to cover the differential between the two during the e arly life of  the project. See 
id . at 109. 
64 See id. at 1 10-ll.  
65 See id. at  11 1 - 1 2. 
66 See id. at 1 10. The introduction of uncertainty also reduces the n umber of equil ib­
rium results. See id. at  1 12 - 1 5. 
For a recent example of another l i ne of finance l i teratu re that articulates models of  
optimal debt capital structures keyed to the t iming of  debt  payments. see Hayne E .  Leland 
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C. The Contingent Control Model of Capital Structure 
Hart thus accesses the basic terms of the debt contract, but 
with a narrow model that assumes complete information and cab­
ins all agency problems of debt and equity in a tightly-defined sce­
nario of end-period opportunism.67 Obviously, a model that 
successfully accesses the role of debt in controlling the agency costs 
of equity will have to relax these constraints. In the real world, 
information will not be complete ex ante, and opportunism will be 
a possibility during all periods and will extend to discretionary 
choices respecting investment and effort level .  The parameters of a 
model of an optimal debt contract, thus expanded,  will give rise to 
agency problems that are unobservable or unverifiable ex post. 
Accordingly, the modeling exercise will have to proceed in an in­
complete contracts framework . 
As noted above, the incomplete contract approach predicts 
that corporate contracts will omit important future variables that 
are difficult or impossible to describe initially,68 and seeks to show 
that the control allocations bound up in the firm's  capital structure 
substitute for this incompleteness .69 S ince these control arrange­
ments also determine the identity of the actors who direct the 
firm's  ongoing management and investment policies, or, in the al­
ternative, determine whether to sell or liquidate the firm, they sig­
nificantly impact on the value of the firm. In the incomplete 
contracts perspective , capital structure optimality depends on con­
trol arrangements. 
1. The Contingent Control Model. 
The base point for examinations of optimal capital structure in 
the incomplete contracts framework is Aghion and Bolton's model 
of contingent control allocation.70 It bears close inspection. 
& Klaus Bjerre Toft. Optimal Capiwl Strucrure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term 
Structure of Credit Spreads, 5 1  .f. FIN.  987 ( 1 996).  T1wy show that the optimal quantum of 
leverage is lower with short-term borrowing. and that short-term borrowing ameliorates 
asset substitution problems. 
67 He assumes that E wil l be able to get away with nonpayment in the last period and  
that  the  problem can  be completely solved wi th  a contract that  provides for  fi na l  repay­
ment in  the penultimate period: i f  the payment schedule does not solve the problem, then 
debt fina ncing is not feasible. 
6S G rossm an & Hart, Verrical & Lateral fntegrarion, supro note 47. and Hart & Moore. 
supra note 47. set out a model of vertical i ntegrat ion and ownership based on this assump­
tion of contractual i ncompleteness .  
6<J See Aghion & B olton. supra note 49,  at  479. 
7 1 1  See id. 
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In Aghion and Bolton's model , once again we get a stylized, 
two-period picture of the relationship between an entrepreneur E 
and a venture capitalist I. In this model E has no wealth and needs 
to finance the entire start up cost K for her project. Once again, 
the world is ful l  of venture capitalists, but contains only a few en­
trepreneurs with good projects . E as a result has all the bargaining 
power: E can make a take it or leave it offer which I will accept so 
long as the deal promises an expected return of at least K. But the 
payout will depend on an action a to be taken from amongst the set 
of feasible actions A by the actor in control after the future realiza­
tion of a state of nature e .  At t = 1 ,  prior to the time for the choice 
of a, the operation of the business will produce a signal s as to the 
state of nature e .  Returns are realized at t = 2 .71 
Investment 
K 
t = O  
Signal s 
as to e 
I I 
t =  I 
action a taken 
Realization of 
returns 
t = 2  
This scenario creates a problem. Returns to E and I both de­
pend on action a, but are received in different forms. B oth E and I 
are risk neutral as to income.  Monetary returns of the project r are 
payable to I at t = 2, minus amounts of compensation payable to E 
pursuant to a compensation schedule in the contract concluded by 
E and I. The compensation arrangement provides a transfer t ;:::: 0, 
the precise amount of which is a function of s and r. Thus, l 's pay­
ment y = r - t .  E also receives significant non-monetary private 
benefits b, such as reputation. These are neither observable nor 
verifiable by third parties . The model assumes that the quantum of 
b is a legitimate part of the overall yield of value from the project. 
Yields of both r and b will depend on the state of nature e and the 
choice of a. E 's yield is a function of r(a, e) + b (a, e) ,  and l 's yield is 
solely a function of r(a,e) . Since the choice of a can differentially 
impact r and b ,  a potential conflict of interest as to the choice of a 
is wrought into the situation.72 
If the state of nature e could be specified ex ante, it might be 
possible for the contract between E and I to direct the party in 
control, presumably £, to take the jointly maximizing action a .  
Unfortunately e i s  impossible or  very cost ly to  describe ex ante , 
71 See id. at 475-76. 
72 See id. at 476. 
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although the parties will be able to identify e ex post. The model 
does, however, assume that even though the E-1 contract cannot be 
made directly contingent on 8, it  can be made contingent on the 
signal s, which is publicly verifiable, although imperfectly corre­
lated with e .  
The occurrence o f  s at t = 1 does not, however, enable the 
drafting of a complete contract. For even if s were perfectly corre­
lated with 8, the project still would be too complex to permit an ex 
ante specification of the optimizing response a to be chosen from 
the set of possibilities A upon the realization of s. Action a is 
wholly within the realm of management business judgment and is 
neither susceptible to direct specification nor to indirect specifica­
tion through a constellation of negative covenants. D irect specifi­
cation might be possible in a different case where A entailed a 
selection between a limited set of identifiable choices such as 
merger, liquidation, sale of assets, or continuation. But, even given 
the feasibility of that sort of specification, ex post judicial enforce­
ment of the contractual directive could still fal l  short of feasibili ty 
if information asymmetries led to problems of third-party 
verification. 
The upshot is that the capital structure 's allocation of control 
rights between E and I will determine the choice of a and the op­
timality (or suboptimality) of the value yielded by the firm.73 The 
capital structure as set out in the E-1 contract inevitably specifies 
an allocation of control, which in turn determines which actor has 
the privilege to chose action a. Control can lie in E or in 1.74 
A number of additional assumptions are made. First, there 
are only two possible future states of nature, 8g and eb .  Second, 
there are only two possible outcomes for s, 0 or 1, with s = 1 mean­
ing that it is more probable than not that e = eg, and s = 0 meaning 
that it is more probable than not that 8 = eb· Third, action set A 
contains only two possible actions , ag and ab. in each of the two 
states of nature 8g and eb .  In state 8g the first-best choice of action 
is ag = a *(8g) ; and in state eb the first-best choice of action is ab = 
a *(81,) . Fourth, there are only two possible returns r at t = 2, either 
0 or 1. Fifth, the initial contract between E and I may be renegoti-
73 See id. at 476-77. 
7-+ The model also a l l ows fur the possib i l i ty that control can be exercised j o i n tly .  In  that  
case the model  assumes that  e i ther  E and I must  agree, or i n  the event o f  disagreement ,  E 
wi l l  make a one-t ime take it or leave it o ffer to I as to choice of a: i n  the event  that  I 
re fuses the offe r cleacllock resul ts a n cl  both parties h ave 0 returns .  Such a joint  control 
setup means that hold ups arc a possib i l i ty  in every case . As a result ,  i n  this model ,  joint 
control a lways is dominmccl by u n i l ateral  or con t i ngen t  con trol .  See id. at  486. 
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a ted after the realization of 8 ,  with all the bargaining power lying 
with E. Sixth, given the specification of first best action ag and ab,  
the expected returns y and private benefits b realized by I and E in 
eg and eb will have the following properties :  
y8gag + b8gag > y8gah + b8gab 
y8"a" + b8"a" > y8bag + b8bag 
And, finally, in order to make the initial investment of K plausible, 
the probability q of yg + (1 - q)yb > K.75 
If a *  were contractible, control could be accorded to the desig­
nee with the greatest expertise respecting the production function 
(here E) with the contract assuring the selection of the optimal 
course of action .  In the alternative world of noncontractibility 
presented here, a* in theory could be the result of a round of ex 
post renegotiation occurring after the realization of s. That is, 
there would occur a round of Coasean bargaining after t = 1 in 
which a noncontrolling party benefited by the choice of a *  
purchases its choice by the controlling party with a side payment.76 
2. E Control 
The model works through the scenarios of E control, I control , 
and joint control to ascertain the distance between the set of results 
built in by the incentive structure and first-best set of results . 
Where E controls ,  first-best choices of action follow in two classes 
of cases. The first is that in which the choice of a* also happens to 
maximize y, b, and the transfer payment t .  Here E's i ncentives are 
perfectly aligned with the general maximizing result . 77 In the sec­
ond class of cases, the first-best result does not follow from the 
incentive structure, but may be reachable through renegotiation. 
Assuming eb, this occurs where b (8bag) + t > b (811ab) + t, and y (8bab) 
> y (8bag)· Recalling that E has all the bargaining power, E will 
offer to choose a* (here 8bab)  if I pays E the sum y (8bab) - y (8bag) , 
provided of course that b (8bab) + t + y (8bab) - y(8bag) � b (8bag) + t .  
I can be expected to accept provided that the yield of y (8bag) � K, 
or in other words, so long as he breaks even. Assuming 8g, this 
occurs where b (8gab) + t > b (8ga�) + t, and y (8gag) > y (8gab) . Since E 
has all the bargaining power, E will offer to choose a *, (here egag) 
if I pays E the sum y (8gag) - y (8gab) , provided of course that 
75 See id. at 477-79. 
76 See HA RT. supra note 59. at 98 (d iscussing the Agh ion-Bol ton model ) .  
77 See Agh ion & Bo l ton, supra note 49, a t  480-81.  
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b (8gag) + t + y (8gag) - y(8gab) ?:: b (8gab) + t. I can be expected to 
accept provided that the yield of y (8gab) ?:: K, the break even figure . 
Such a renegotiation will not result in every case , however. 
The model assumes that the return of at least K constitutes a ra­
tionality constraint for I. Thus, the renegotiation will fail, and the 
first-best result will not be chosen if the value of K is so high that it 
exceeds the yield on offer in E's renegotiation. Indeed, the very 
possibility of these situations means that I can be expected to re­
fuse to invest at t = 0 unless some form of protection against E's 
opportunism is included in the contract package . 78 
3. I Control 
Here, first-best choices of action will follow only where the 
choice of a that maximizes y happens to be a* ,  meaning that I's 
incentives are perfectly aligned with the general maximizing result. 
Where the choice of a that maximizes y is not first-best there can 
be room for Pareto improving renegotiation. But, as already seen, 
renegotiation amounts to the payment of a bribe to the actor in 
control from the actor disadvantaged by the suboptimal choice of 
a. The model's assumption of a wealth constraint on E 's part sub­
stantially limits the possibility of renegotiation where I controls .  
Simply, since b and t constitute E 's entire wealth, E lacks the re­
sources to make the bribe. For I control to assure first-best results, 
then, the amount of t has to be set high enough to give E sufficient 
cash for the bribe. This adjustment creates the same situation as 
the search for the first-best under E control. As t increases, pro­
jected investment returns to I fall short of K at some point and I 
refuses to invest. 79 
4. Contingent Control-the Efficiency Function of Debt 
The Aghion-Bolton model interpolates the device of contin­
gent control to solve the problem presented by the misalignment of 
the incentives of E and I. Two additional assumptions have to be 
made in order to make the model work, however-that y8gag < 
y8gah and that b8bab < b8bag . These inequalities al ign the class of 
cases in which l can be expected to make a suboptimal choice of a 
to 8.�  states and the class of cases in which E can be expected to 
make a suboptimal choice of a to eb states. With this alignment, I 
will make a first-best choice in eb and E will m a ke a first-best 
7:;  See id. at 480-83. 
7<J See id. at 483-84. 
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choice in 8a, and a contract that accords control to I in 8b  and E in 
" 
eg will be optimal. 
Since 8 is unverifiable,  the feasibility of such an arrangement 
depends on the degree of correlation between s and 8 .80 Given the 
requisite correlation, an optimal arrangement can be m ade opera­
tional with relative ease given a world with a frictionless bank­
ruptcy process . I's participation simply takes the form of debt and 
the realization of s at t = 1 is  made a default/no-default event , with 
default occurring in a eb state .81 In the event of default, E becomes 
bankrupt and I takes control and chooses the first-best a; in 8g 
states there is no default and E remains in charge .82 
D .  Implications for the Public Corporation 
] . Debt, Executive Employment Contracts, and Dividends in a 
World Presenting Problems of Observability and 
Verifiability 
Although the contingent control model deals with a stylized 
close corporation, it has some important implications respecting 
agency problems in publicly traded firms. First, the model implies 
that a provision for the transfer of control to outside investors 
holding debt may build a governance disincentive into the firm's 
capital structure respecting management pursuit of private bene­
fits .  To see this , assume that the contract is drafted so that a pay­
ment is due on the debt at t = 1 ,  and the amount of the payment to 
be based on a projection such that E should have the abil ity to 
meet the payment in a 8g state, but will not meet the payment in a 
eb state . The provision for a payment accomplishes a transfer of 
control, with no attendant problems of observability and ver­
ifiability . Debt's role in agency cost reduction is thus recharacter­
ized. In earlier agency cost literature , debt bonded E to pay money 
out to !. Here, it effects a transfer of control to a party better posi � 
tioned to maximize the value of the assets based on transparent 
and verifiable events-payment and nonpayment. Note also that 
the critical event of default need not be a payment default. So long 
as s is verifiable ,  it can be employed as the default contingency with 
payment on the debt being delayed until t = 2. 
A subsidiary implication becomes apparent if the contingent 
control model is considered together with a Hart observation re-
:-> l l  See id. at 4S4-S6. 
:-; 1 The precedent model is  found in  Jamie F.  Zender. Oprimal Financial Instrumenrs. 26 
. f .  F:�. 1 645 ( 1 99 1 ). 
,-;;: Set: Aghion & Bolton. supra note 49. at 487. 
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specting the timing of debt payments: Short-term debt is the harder 
claim from a governance point of view. This point is formalized in 
subsequent work by Berglof and von Thadden.83 They model a 
firm which, unlike the firm in Aghion and Bolton's model, has un­
verifiable income streams in addition to firm specific assets. Such a 
firm has difficulty making a credible commitment to lenders ex 
ante because its position of informational superiority creates op­
portunities for strategic renegotiation of the debt contract in the 
event of distress. The model shows that a capital structure contain­
ing secured short-term and subordinated long-term debt held by 
separate actors will be superior to a structure where the same ac­
tors hold both short- and long-term claims. It is superior because 
the stand alone short-term creditor rationally takes a tough posi­
tion in the event of distress. S ince this actor is positioned to fore­
close on assets and has no long-term interest in the firm, he 
remains relatively immune to the debtor's strategic renegotiation 
offer.84 A typology showing variations in the enforcement postures 
of different securities by degrees of hardness is invited, with short­
term debt being the toughest, long term debt taking an intermedi­
ate position, and equity emerging as the soft outside claim.85 
Third, the contingent claim model implies a question respect­
ing the relative effectiveness of employment contracts and control 
transfer structures as a means to channel management incentives in 
productive directions. To the extent that crucial management 
choices-selections of a from sets A-are noncontractible due to 
problems of observability and verifiability, monetary incentive 
schemes based on firm profitability or stock market performance 
cannot be expected to import adequate discipline. Control struc­
tures allowing outsiders to take actions that managers dislike in the 
event of poor firm performance, although a second-best solution , 
can be expected to do a more effective job of manipulating man­
agement incentives in productive directions.86 
S3 See generally Erik B erglbf & Ernst-Ludwig von 1l1adden. Short- Term Versus Lon::;­
Term interests: Capital Strucwre with Multiple in vestors, 1 09 Q.J .  EcoN. 1 055 ( 1 994 ) .  
S4 Paul Asquith e t  a l . ,  Anatomy of Financial Distress: A n  Examination of Junk-Bond 
fssuers. 109 Q .J .  E coN. 625 ( 1 994), supplies some empirical conf·irmation for this point. 
1l1 is study illustrates the di fferent behavior of bank creditors and j unk bond holders of 
distressed borrowers. The banks, unl ike the junk bond holders. do not forgive principal 
( although they do extend maturity). The banks also tend to refuse refin �mcing outside of 
ban kruptcy. 
::->5 See Berglof & von Tbadden, supra note 83, at 1 058-59. 
S6 See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of D ebr and Equit,·: Diversirv of 
Secu riries and Manager-Shareholder Congruence , 109 Q.J .  EcoN. 1027.  l 028 ( 1 994 ) .  
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Hart offers a more formal  expression of this point . He notes 
that, given managers who derive no private benefits from control 
of assets, first-best results easily can be achieved (in a taxless 
world) with an all equity capital structure and a simple incentive 
compensation system. In a two-period situation he would simply 
make the managers' compensation depend entirely on the divi­
dend. That is, incentive compensation I should = n( dl + d2) , 
where TT is a small positive number. If the payment also covers 
l iquidation proceeds-! = n[dl + (d2, L)]-the manager can be 
expected to make an optimal decision respecting liquidation at t = 
1 .  If L > y2 , the firm is liquidated at t = 1 and no indebtedness is 
needed to align management incentives .87 But managers do derive 
private benefits from asset management, and in Hart's  conception, 
the bribe TT required to align their incentives with those of the 
outside security holders is unfeasibly large. Accordingly, a com­
plex capital structure that includes control mandates must be 
interpolated. 
Now consider the steady payout convention respecting divi­
dends in light of the three factors identified as determinant in these 
models-management's powerful incentive to pursue private bene­
fits, the ongoing unobservability and unverifiability of management 
performance , and the remedial effect of a clear-cut, mandated pay­
ment to an outside investor. Add the fact that the accounting sys­
tem allows managers at least some room to manipulate the amount 
of reported earnings . To the extent of that allowance, amounts of 
both earnings and reinvested earnings are unverifiable .  This ver­
ifiability problem suggests an information function for the steady 
dividend. Although the amount of earnings may be subject to 
question, the amount of the dividend, once declared, is not. This 
very concreteness lends the dividend a governance function related 
Similar observations have been made respecting the agency dynamics o f  investment 
within a firm. Arj i t  Mukherj i  & Nandu Nagarajan ,  Moral Hazard and Contractibility in 
In vestment Decisions, 26 J. EcoN. BEHJ\V. & 0 RG .  4 1 3  ( 1 995) ,  models the situation or a 
principal investing in research and development projects. 1l1e authors show that if the 
principal receives verifiable "hard" signals concerning the quality of the projects during the 
development period, the principal will be able to make a ful l  ex ante commitment to a 
project but that problems of opportunism and monitoring costs st i l l  will make for a second 
best result-the principal rationally will overinvest relative to the first best. In contrast. in 
a world holding out only "soft" noncontractible information prior to the last period. they 
predict unclerinvestment. 
K7 See HART, supra note 59, at 1 46-48. Note an interesting real world impl ication of 
these observations-incentive compensation should not come in the form of stock options 
but in the form of i l l iquid long-term positions in the stock. 
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to that of debt .88 Although it triggers no control transfer,89 if paid 
steadily it does perform an ongoing screening function.90 
2 .  Contingent Control with Outside Debt and Outside Equity 
Two subsequent models, from Dewatripont and Tirole91 and 
from Hart,92 explore the interplay between two principal points 
emerging from the Aghion-Bolton contingent control model. First, 
the form and timing of rights attending the firm's payment stream 
determine incentives critical to the firm's value. Second, problems 
of noncontractibility limit the capacity of compensation schemes to 
move management incentives in productive directions. Both mod­
els include extensions to dividend policy .  
Dewatripont and Tirole present another two-period contin­
gent control model. Unlike the Aghion-Bolton model, this one in­
cludes outside debt and outside equity interests. Here, at t = 0,  
outside financing and incentive compensation arrangements are 
worked out and management chooses an effort level e. The level of 
88 This is Fudenberg and Tirole's suggestion. See Fudenberg & Tirole ,  supra note 35.  
Their model addresses information asymmetries within a multidivisional corporation and 
looks to the dividend paymen t  stream as a means of alleviating the problem.  Here. the 
value of the dividend does not l ie in a tendency to force management to step up the level of 
borrowing. but because the dividend is, like debt. a verifiable amount.  As i n  other incom­
plete contracts models, noncontractible aspects of management employment generate the 
problem. 
Fudenberg and Tirole discuss the dividend as an incident to their study of the implica­
tions of the practice of income smoothing. Income smoothing is the manipulation of the 
timing of reports of revenues and expenses toward the end of making the e a rn ings stream 
less variable over time. Since the practice can entail  temporal manipulation of actual busi­
ness operations. i t  can increase the costs of doing business. I t  either results from exploita­
tion of flexibility bui l t  into the system of  generally accepted accounting principles.  or from 
direct manipulation of business operations. The latter case can include poor timing of  
sales, overtime paid to lead to acceleration of shipments, and disruption of the schedules of  
suppliers and customers. See id. a t  76. In Fudenberg and Tirole's model, income smooth­
ing follows from a combination of risk aversion and private benetlts retention by divisional 
managers, encouraged by corporate headquarters' inability to commit itself credibly to 
long-term incentive contracts with them. The managers expect that poor performance will 
lead to central intervention that diminishes their private benefits. The managers have an 
incentive to boost earni ngs in bad times to forestal l  in tervention. and to understate earn­
ings in good times as a way of saving for later .  1l1e model assumes that the costs of income 
smoothing are less than those of intensive auditing and monitoring that would be required 
in order to eliminate the practice. See id. at 80. 
t-:9 At least not directly. 
YO Sec Fudenberg & Ti role. supra note 35. at 88-90. B u t. on the other hand. since the 
dividend carries no promise to  pay a se t amount. i t  a lso lends itself to  smoothing over time. 
See id. at  78. 
'! 1 See generally Dewatripont & Ti role. supro note 86. 
n Here.  Hart's book. HART. supra note 59.  draws on Oliver Hart & John Moore . A 
Theory of Debt Based on 1he lnalienobilily of Human Copiwl. 1 09 Q.J .  E coN. 84 1 ( i 994) .  
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e will be either high or low, with high e producing higher returns in 
later periods , but resulting in the incurrence of a utility cost U to 
the managers. At t = 1 the firm reports its first period profit, npl ,  a 
verifiable amount that is determined by e ,  but which is not a suffi­
cient statistic for e. In addition, a s ignal s is realized at this point. 
The distribution of signal s also is determined by e, and s i s  a suffi­
cient statistic for the profit to be realized at t = 2, np2 .  B ut s is 
noncontractible and management compensation accordingly can­
not be made directly contingent on it. 
This model ' s  distinguishing assumption is that the firm's capi­
tal structure accords decisionmaking power to either the outside 
debt holder or the outside equity holder at a critical moment. 
More specifical ly ,  immediately after t = 1 ,  the outside holder ac­
corded this control power takes action a, which can either be acqui­
escence and continuance C in present management operations or 
stoppage S of management' s  continued pursuit of its business plan. 
Stoppage S can entail any number of subsequent actions , including 
liquidation , sale of a division or other downsizing, or redirection of 
investment policy. Whatever the action taken, for any given signal 
s, S entails less risky subsequent management than C, the 
probability distribution of which has fatter upper and lower tails . 
At t = 2,  np2 is realized and income is shared in accordance with 
the contracts in the capital structure .93 
Investment Realization of np I 
and contract and signal s 
t=O t= l 
choice of f' action o taken 
Realization of 
np2 
I I 
t=2 
The model examines two possible incentive compensation 
schemes for E, one constituted of private benefits only and the 
other including a salary. The purpose of any such scheme is of 
course to induce E to choose a high level e. But, given the modeL 
and in particular the noncontractibility of s ,  the optimal arrange­
ment must include a possibility of punishment in the form of a con­
trol transfer to outsiders who have the power to choose action 5 .  
Since management always prefers C to S (whether or not C i s  effi­
cient) ,  a structure that increases the possibility of such intervention 
as npl and s decl ine lends management an incentive to choose a 
high level of e ,  maximizing the possibility of a choice of C despite 
<J3 Sec Dewatri pont & Tirole. supra note 86. at 1 03 1 -34. 
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the cost of U thereby incurred. Given this , any bonus payments 
should be based on earnings results of both npl and np2 ,  with the 
np2 target level rising as the npl amount declines .94 
The model depicts the control decisions of outside debt and 
equity investors in terms of incentives, with the nature of the pay­
ment stream being the behavioral determinant. Given the model 's 
structure, an outside investor making a choice between S and C 
whose interest in the firm is an equity-like payment stream-that 
is, whose payment is convex in the final value of the firm at t = 2-
will prefer action C across a broader range signals s. Conversely, 
an investor making a choice between S and C whose interest in the 
firm is realized as a debt-like payment stream-that is, whose pay­
ment is concave in the final value of the firm at t = 2-will prefer 
action S across a broader range signals s. The model formally 
shows that the outside investors' incentives, determined by their 
payment streams, will not necessarily be aligned so that the optimal 
action a is taken given particular combinations of npl and s .  A 
debt bias in the capital structure leads to excessive toughness in the 
form of choice of S in cases where C produces more value. Con­
versely, an equity bias leads to excessive passivity in form of choice 
of C in cases where S would be optimaP5 Thus, an effective 
scheme of external interference requires a specific correlation be­
tween control rights and income streams of multiple securities. 
3 .  Debt and Nlanagement Empire Building: Applications of 
Contingent Control Models to Dividend Policy 
Hart explores the same set of questions against a sequence of 
simplified two-period scenarios.% For Hart, as for Berglbf and von 
Thadden,97 short term debt imports the hardest discipline . To ex­
emplify this ,  he adjusts his two-period model of debt payment tim-
9 -'  See id.  a t  1035-39. If  there is a trading market  i n  the firm ·s secur i t i es these resul ts 
should not change . or so Dewatripon t and Tirole argue. They note that i f  the market price 
perfec tly ref lects s.  i t  can be argued that as  of 1 = 1 a stand-alone compensation scheme 
could be based on the s tock price with opt imal resu l ts .  B ut they counter tha t  so long as the 
managers derive private benefi ts from C. control r ights  wi l l  matter at r = 1 .  and that  since 
the moral hazard problem persists to t =  2 .  compensa tion ought to rctlect r = 2 results also. 
ln addition. the stock price m igh t  be distorted by noise trading or asset bubbles. See id. at 
1 039. 
Y:' See id. at 1 046. 
'.ih As already noted. he joins Dcwatr ipon t and Ti role in asserting that management 
derives s ignificant pr ivate benefi ts from controll ing corporate assets and t hat this prefer­
ence is so pronounced that i t  cannot be control led through an incent ive compensat ion 
scheme. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
Y7 And for that  matter .  Dewatripont and Tirok. See Dewatripont & Tirole. supra note 
86. at I 043-46. 
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ing (presented above )98 to remove the possibility of asset 
liquidation at t = 1 .  The result is  that the faster payment schedule 
entailed in short term borrowing due at t = 1 becomes the ultimate 
showstopper against empire-building managers . Restating this 
point under conditions of certainty, so long as y2 > L ,  long term 
debt is optimal-no payments pl should be due at t = 1 ,  and pay­
ments p2 should be due at t = 2. But if y2 < L then a large payment 
pl should be scheduled at t = 1 .  However, optimal results prove 
harder to obtain when uncertainty is interpolated. Hart models the 
situation where values will be e ither state a (yl"' y2a and La;, or 
state b (yl h y2b and Lb) . He works though various possible interre­
l ationships between levels of debt, states a and b, and first-best 
results. He finds that for at least one scenario no first-best level of 
debt can be set-where y2a > La and y2b < Lh, and, further, yla + 
y2a 5, yl b + y2b but yl a 5, yl b· In state b liquidation should occur at t 
= 1 ,  while in state a no payment pl should be due at t = 1 .  Setting 
the t = 1 payment pl at a level to trigger default in state b triggers a 
default and liquidation in state a where it is inefficient .  Thus, in 
theory, high debt can trigger an inefficient l iquidation just as low 
debt can prevent an efficient liquidation. 99 
Hart also examines the possibility that the insight bound up in 
this model might imply a set of terms for an all-equity capital struc­
ture . Since yl , y2 and L are observable but not verifiable ,  state 
contingent contracting is not feasible. Further, the m anager 's  
power-for-money tradeoff so favors power as to make it useless to 
offer it a direct payment to choose L at t = 1 in the appropriate 
case . But an appropriate constraint could fol low from an all-equity 
capital structure that (a) forbade any additional equity financing 
after t = 0 and (b) provided for dismissal of the manager at t = 1 
unless a large dividend payment dl * was paid. The provision for 
dl * substitutes for a high pl . Hart argues, however, that this eq­
uity substitution does not import the same flexibility as does the 
use of debt. With debt, payment mandates can be divided between 
t = 1 and t = 2, and thus the y2 flow can be taken into account as 
well as the y1 flow in the exercise of control .  1 00 
Hart, having rejected the alternative of an all-equity capi tal 
structure, goes forward to consider the additional implications of 
his assertion that debt plays the critical role in solving the agency 
problems of equity. He adj usts his two-period model to consider 
<JK See supra text accompanying notes 59-66. 
<J<J See HART, supra note 59, at  1 34-35. 
100 See id. at  1 3 5 -36. 
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the situation of suboptimal earnings reinvestment by an established 
profitable company. In this version y2 is always > L ,  so that liqui­
dation at t = 1 is always suboptimal, short-term debt has no govern­
ance role to play, and the debt optimally is set up so that pl = 0 
and p2 = 1 .  A problem arises when management has a new project 
in which it can invest at t = 1 .  The project costs k > yl , and, as a 
result, management must resort to outside financing for a portion I 
of the cost k. The investment returns r at t = 2 .  An empire-build­
ing manager will invest so long as yl + y2 + r - p2 :::: I. But this 
allows the possibility of a suboptimal result-an r < k investment 
can be made if p2 is small relative to yl + y2 . Conversely, if p2 is 
large relative to yl + y2 , a good investment-where r > k-might 
be passed up. Thus, a low level of indebtedness at t = 0, and a 
correspondingly low p2 assures that all r > k investments will be 
undertaken. Conversely, high long-term debt and a high p2 assures 
that r < k investments can never be undertaken. Restating this 
point, although a pattern of suboptimal earnings reinvestment may 
indicate an insufficient level of long-term debt, leverage to excess 
may create an underinvestment problem. 1 0 1  
Hart reaches a similarly equivocal result when he modifies the 
model to confront the free cash flow problem more directly. Here 
management has unlimited projects k and in all of them r = 0. 
Once again y2 > L in all cases, so that liquidation is not a desirable 
cure for the problem. Hart looks to short-term borrowing for a 
cure . vVhere long-term debt-that is, debt with a high p2-was 
drawn on to deter suboptimal investment in the previous model, 
here short-term borrowing is added to the mix and both pl and p2 
are set high. Given certainty, one merely needs to set pl = yl and 
p2 = y2 completely to solve the free cash flow problem. Unfortu­
nately, the world of the 1980s leveraged buy out will then be revis­
ited. Hart works this problem into his model when he interpolates 
uncertainty. A risk of suboptimal liquidation opens up accord­
ingly-with a high pl and a high p2, an external shock to either yl  
or  y2 triggers liquidation. The higher the risk of  such a shock, the 
lower pl and p2 should be set. 1 02 
Dewatripont and Tirole replicate the thrust of this result in the 
context of their model. They work in the reinvestment problem by 
proposing that management encounters a second, optional invest­
ment proj ect after t = 0 and before t = 1 .  The second proj ect may 
be good or bad, and, if undertaken, will effect the amount of np . 
l U I  See id. at 1 36-38. TI1is model a lso is opened up for uncertainty. See id. at 1 38-39. 
102 See id. at 1 40-4 ! .  1 52-55 .  
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They observe that, given the parameters of their model, including 
its incentive payment component, there is no disincentive respect­
ing selection of a bad project. So long as the project increases the 
upper tail of the t = 2 distribution i t  increases manageria l  rent, and, 
interestingly ,  is not necessarily undertaken to the detriment of the 
equity interest. There can be no guarantee of separation (a man­
agement preference for no project ahead of selection of a bad pro­
j ect) so long as the firm's financial structure is invariant upon 
project choice . The cure lies in assuring that capital structure does 
vary when new projects yielding higher rewards for m anagement 
are undertaken . 1 03 Concurrent short -term borrowing is the sug­
gested adjustment, bringing Dewatripont and Tirole into an exact 
alignment with Hart at the bottom line. 104 
4. Internal Finance Compared 
Another model, this one from Gertner, Scharfstein, and 
Stein, 1 05 complicates the foregoing analysis. Here, the incomplete 
contracts approach is applied to the incentives that prevail inside of 
firms with respect to projects financed with internal ly generated 
capital. Those incentives are then compared to those that follow 
upon short-term borrowing. More specifically, in this two-period 
model a stand alone single project firm financed by short-term 
bank borrowing (as in Hart and Moore) is played off against the 
same project undertaken as a division of a conglomerate corpora­
tion and financed through cash flows from corporate headquarters. 
The model shows that both internal and external finance have 
strengths and weaknesses. 
One strength of internal finance is a higher incentive to moni­
tor. Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein define monitoring as observa­
tion of a project that generates economically valuable ideas. Such 
ideas require implementation, and the owner of the proj ect has the 
right to decide whether to implement. The model shows that inter­
nal finance and ownership in corporate headquarters generates 
more valuable monitoring than does bank financing. The bank 
under-monitors because it does not control the assets. If  bank 
monitoring does give rise to an idea, the bank can of course hold 
up the borrower for a portion of the returns of implementation in 
1 03 See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 86. at  1 047-48. 
1 o-1 For a model tha t  combines the thrust of th is  treatment with the insights of  the signal­
l ing l i tera ture. see Thomas H. Noe & M ichael J .  Rebello, Asymmetric Information, J'v/ano­
gerial Opportunism, Financing, il/1(1 Payout Policies. 5 1  J .  FrN. 637 ( 1 996 ) .  
1115 Sec Robert H. G ertner e t  a l . ,  Internal Versus Exrernol Capital i\1arkets. 1 09 Q.J .  
EcoN. 1 211 ( 1 994) . 
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exchange for the idea's disclosure. But the bank still has the lesser 
incentive because it does not receive all the gains. 1 06 A second 
strength of internal finance stems from possibilities for internal as­
set redeployment. Here , Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein make ref­
erence to the literature confirming that distressed assets tend to 
sell for distressed prices, 1 07 thereby relaxing this literature's usual 
assumption that upon default , the outside lender will realize L. In 
their model,  L proves to be fully or nearly fully realizable only 
where the firm's assets are nonspecific ones like land and buildings . 
As the assets become more firm specific, the bank 's liquidation 
yield drops relative to the value of the asset. Internal finance 
emerges as superior to the extent that corporate headquarters can 
invest in multiple related projects , positioning itself to recoup more 
for redeployment upon failure . 108 
Outside bank financing also has advantages. The first con­
cerns manager incentives. Recall that the basic incomplete con­
tracts model of debt financing leaves the manager of the successful 
project in complete control after t = 1 ,  retaining all value over p .  
This produces a high-powered incentive that cannot b e  built into 
an intra-corporate financing arrangement. Even if corporate head­
quarters could contract not to fire the successful divisional manag­
ers, it still owns the assets and thereby retains some power to 
reduce the managers ' private benefits . With internal financing, 
then, gains are shared ,  incentives are less powerful ,  and effort 
levels are lower. 109 In addition, corporate headquarters is pre­
sumed to be in closer contact with the project managers than is the 
outside bank , implying a higher level of influence costs . This 
counterbalances the greater likelihood of productive monitoring 
with internal finance-headquarters is "more likely to be wined 
and dined and ultimately won over" by the divisional manager than 
is the bank. 1 10 
E. Incomplete Contracts and the Dividend Puzzle 
1. From Intrinsic Optimality to Noncontractibility 
The incomplete contract models bear a familial resemblance 
to earl ier agency models of dividend policy. Here again, conven-
1 1 16 See id. at 1 2 1 9-.20. 
1 1 17  See Asquith e t  aL supra note 84:  Andrei Shle i fer & Robert W .  Vishny .  Liquidarion 
Values and Debr Capacity: A i'vlarker Equilibrium Approaclz . 47 J .  F 1r-.: .  1 343 ( 1 992) .  
I IlK See Gertner e t  a ! . .  supra note 105.  a t  1 223-27. 
I O'l S'ee id. at 1 220-23. 
1 1 1 1  /d. a t  1 229 .  
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tional dividend payout patterns are explained in terms of the prac­
tical likelihood that replacement investment dollars will be 
borrowed. Here again, the dividend forces self-serving managers 
to the capital markets , leverage enhances firm value , and manage­
ment will resist an optimal leverage pol icy. And here again, the 
control threat embodied in the possibility of default has a positive 
incentive effect. 
But there are also significant changes of emphasis. The origi­
nal agency models completed the incomplete corporate contract 
with a reference to trading markets in corporate securities. Infor­
mation was unproblematic because the stock price contained and 
communicated it .  Multi-period models were unnecessary because 
the stock price was appropriately discounted for agency risks at the 
time of original issue. Thereafter, market forces kept agency 
problems in check on an ongoing concern basis. The Rozeff model 
and the Easterbrook model implied that the conventional dividend 
payout pattern is an optimal expression of market discipline. In a 
competitive equilibrium, after all ,  discretionary behavior cannot 
survive. 1 1 1  
With the incomplete contracts models, market prices d o  not 
solve problems of information asymmetry. The solution to 
problems of observability and verifiability instead lies in the per­
formance of the debt contract. Since the steady dividend prompts 
borrowings governed by the debt contract, it emerges as a lesser 
version of the same solution to the problem of noncontractibility. 
These models also work from an underlying concept of agency re­
lationships quite distinct from that operative in the complete con­
tracts model of Jensen and Meckling and its many progeny in legal 
theory. Consider the assertion in Dewatripont and Tirole and Hart 
that an incentive contract cannot feasibly protect against empire­
building managers . Then compare the behavioral failings of Jensen 
and Meckling's managers-shirking and excessive consumption of 
perquisites. The latter conception of the agency problem invites 
easy disposition with cash payments and contractual prohibitions. 
Fai ling the appearance of such an effective contractual technology, 
the Jensen and Meckling model goes on to assume that capital and 
product market competition completes the incomplete contract, 
fully disciplining culpable managers within a reasonable time . 1 1 2 
1 1 I See Aaron S. Edl in  & Joseph E .  St igl i tz. Discouraging Rivals: Aianagenzenl Rent­
Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, 85 A M .  EcoN. REv. 1 30 1 .  1 301  ( 1 995 ) . 
1 1 2  See S .A .  Ravicl & E.F. Sucl i t .  Power Seeking Managers, Profitable D ividends and Fi­
nancing Decisions. 25 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & O Re. .  241 ( 1 994) .  
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The empire builders in the incomplete contracts models make a 
different trade-off between money and the satisfaction of control­
ling assets , and are much less susceptible to market discipline.  1 1 3 
Reconsider the Rozeff dividend model in light of this point. 
Like the incomplete contracts models, Rozeff's model accords a 
prominent role to the borrowed replacement dollar. But Rozeff 
also conceives of dividends as a substitute for incentive-aligning 
management stock ownership. The incomplete contracts models ,  
although certainly assuming that some contracts align incentives 
better than others , perceive no chance for dividend payouts to fig­
ure into such an easily optimal alignment of incentives. The man­
agers, quite simply, draw too much satisfaction from the private 
benefits yielded by control of corporate assets . Removal from con­
trol is the only palliative. 
Reconsider also the Easterbrook dividend model. Easter­
brook located the benefit of the dividend in the monitoring that 
results when the firm has to go outside for new capital. The incom­
plete contracts models, although quite sensitive to the importance 
of information and monitoring, shift emphasis to the form of the 
resultant financing. They relocate the point of agency cost reduc­
tion to the structural result that fol lows the reference to outside 
financing rather than in an investigatory process carried out by 
capital market actors . The shift makes sense. If management goes 
to the capital markets to sell additional equity rather than to bor­
row, resultant monitoring may be even more intense , but no gov­
ernance benefi ts will redound in future periods . However intense 
such capital market scrutiny, it can neither access the unobservable 
nor confirm (or falsify) the unverifiable. 
When monitoring does become the center of attention in in­
complete contracts models, particular incentive questions are 
asked about the design of the monitoring contract. 1 1 4 These ques­
tions ask us to compare the different monitoring incentives follow­
ing from the different available modes of outside finance, toward 
the end of assuring not only that outsiders have information about 
1 1 3 Sec id a t  244. 
1 1 4 See Ernst -Ludwig von Thaddcn. Long- Term Controcrs. 5'/wrr- Term Jnvestnzenr and 
;'v!on itoring. 62 Rt:v. EcuN.  Sn m .  557 ( 1 995) .  Von Thadclcn takes up the problem created 
by m anagement  aversion to tl rst period inspect ion of a project by long-term outs ide l inan­
cir.:rs with a power to terminate .  Management may prefer a ser ies  or  subopt ima l  short-term 
investment proj ects .  His  model takes up  the alternat ive of a short-term cre d i t  tac i l i ty  wi th  
an a t tached long- term commitment  from a financier who performs a "de legated monitor­
ing" function.  See id.  a t  558-59: sec also Douglas W. Diamond. Financial Intermediation 
and Delegutc Monitoring. 5 1  REv. Ecot'. Snm. 393 ( ! 984 ) .  
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goings on inside the firm, but that the firm selects the best available 
investment projects. This literature requires that such questions be 
asked because it no longer assumes that a reified "market" sees 
through the veil that obscures outsiders ' access to corporate infor­
mation, thereby automatically encouraging a choice of efficient 
projects. No such assumption is safe given asymmetric information 
and strategic behavior. 
2. Noncontmctibility and Capital Structure Optimality 
The incomplete contracts models join the wider literature of 
information economics in abandoning the early agency models'  
complete reliance on market price and market discipline. As such, 
they leave the legal observer in an uncomfortable position of un­
certainty. This literature does not promise immediate evolution to 
a first-best competitive equilibrium in the absence of sovereign in­
tervention. It instead poses complex informational problems that 
are susceptible to solution only in stylized models. The models 
teach that debt solves problems of information asymmetry and 
suboptimal incentives by vesting a clear cut control transfer contin­
gency. Yet this yields no policy prescription because the vesting of 
the contingency turns out to implicate complex variables. 
In the incomplete contracts picture , debt makes production 
more efficient in those states of the world in which actions that 
enhance the value of the debt payment stream are also the actions 
that maximize the value of the firm. The holders of debt should 
step into control ,  and debt should be incurred in amounts and 
under terms so as to trigger control transfers on those states of the 
world. 1 1 5  Contrariwise, incorrectly set triggers reduce firm value. 
The models assert emphatically that there is such a thing as too 
much debt, and thereby identify it as a source of governance 
problems as well as governance solutions. This diagnosis is vari­
ously articulated. In the Dewatripont and Tirole model , too much 
debt means that conservative, variance-reducing business p lans are 
chosen across too wide a class of situations. In the Hart and Moore 
model, excess debt means that liquidation occurs when continua­
tion realizes more value. In addition, Gertner, Scharfstein, and 
Stein show us that internal fmance possesses certain incentive and 
cost advantages relative to debt. In sum, leverage entails a trade­
off between a harder incentive structure that deters private benefit  
' 1 5 Restat ing t h e  poi n t  to rdlect t h e  fact t h a t  t h e  fulcrum provision goes t o  t h e  size o f  
the pa vments clue a t  1 = 1 and r = 2. t h e  tirm should borrow a n  amount such t h a t  the 
lenders should assume control when it is  opt imal that  they do so. 
i 
I 
i � 
l 
1997] DIVIDENDS 447 
seeking and the risk that the control transfer that imports hardness 
will occasion suboptimal business decision making. Because these 
models work against a dynamic background that builds in uncer­
tainty about future events, they offer no calculus for the amount 
and terms of the debt contract that optimally balances the trade. 
The trade-off is further complicated by an additional factor. 
Our experience with the high leverage models of the 1980s has 
trained us to think in terms of a zone of alignment between high 
leverage capital structures and the interests of outside equity hold­
ers. TI1e Dewatripont and Tirole analysis inserts a cautionary note 
respecting this assumption when it suggests that there may be an 
expansive zone of alignment of the incentives of management and 
outside equity respecting levels of debt and internal financing. The 
reason is simple: Management and equity stand together in prefer­
ring that control not be transferred to the debt, and accordingly 
both react in a risk averse way respecting the level of debt in­
curred. It follows that if real world firms maintain suboptimally 
low levels of debt, then they do so because of an alignment be­
tween the incentives of management and equity . 1 10 
1 1 1i A quest ion arises at t h is point in the  analysis .  I n  the 1 980s models.  the operative 
p icture of the preferences of equi ty was derived by analogy from the B lack-Scholes option 
pricing model .  See Fisher B lack & M yron Scholes.  The Pricing of Oprions and Corpora1e 
Liabilities. 8 1  J. PoL. EcoN. 637 ( 1 973) .  Under the  derivation. equ i ty was not  r isk averse 
and increased asset volat i l i ty  enhanced equi ty  values. How can that point  be preserved in 
a description that s imultaneously holds out a common element of risk aversion on the part 
o f  manage ment  and equity? The answer l ies in the  t iming of  the  descript ion.  The e lement  
of  r i sk  aversion concerns the choice of  the  leve l  o f  debt-the decision as to whether  to  
borrow at a l l .  I n  B lack-Scholes terms. th i s  becomes a choice among a menu  of  opt ion 
contracts wi th  different str iking prices and dura tions.  TI1e behavioral e ffects discovered by  
B lack and Scholes fol low on ly  once  one of the options on the menu is  chosen. ll1e inten­
s i ty of any resul t ing propensity toward r isk-taking wi l l  depend on that  opt ion's terms.  TI1a t  
selection wil l  i n  turn  depend on an  ex an te appraisa l .  G iven tha t  th is  opt ion hedges noth­
ing and s takes the ent i re  equ i ty investment .  r i sk aversion can be expected to come into the 
selection process. Meanwhi le .  at the bottom l ine .  the B lack-Scholcs v iew of  equi ty  and the 
incomplete contracts l i terature make the  common point that  the maximizat ion of  t he value 
of the equ i ty payment stream and the maximization of the value of the firm proceed under 
materi a l ly d i fferent calculations. Fina l ly .  i t  should be noted that the ident i fication of  a 
common e lt:ment of risk aversion common to management and equi ty respect ing levels of  
inclebtc:dness does not imp ly  an assertion of a complete iclent i tv o f  in terest between the  
two .  Har t  s tr ikingly restates the  core management-sh areholder agency problem when he  
notes tha t .  but for management ' s  pursu i t  or  the  private benefi ts  o f  asset control .  an a l l ­
equ i ty capital structure compensating management with a smal l  pro rata share of the divi­
dend payout pool would be opt imal .  
The incomplete contracts models are onlv j ust beginning to art iculate a descript ion of  
management-shareholder relat ionships. A t  this s tage. their  descript ive contribution l ies 
primarily in the negative point that optimal management incen tives arc noncontractible 
and cont rol transfer devices must be resorted to on a second-best basis. Presumably. other 
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3. Noncontractibility and the Dividend 
The dividend reemerges under incomplete contracts as a de­
vice with two functions. First, it ameliorates problems of observa­
tion and verification by transforming an unreliable book entry into 
a tangible payment. Second, it adjusts capital structures in the di­
rection of an optimal control transfer provision by prompting bor­
rowing. The dividend thus reemerges in a second-best world. 
Since the optimal  level of debt is uncertain, the optimal  level of 
retained earnings and dividends is also uncertain. The combination 
of that uncertainty, managements' pursuit of private benefits, and 
the shareholders' l ack of control provides a working explanation of 
the dividend 's real world tendency to fal l  short of an optimal 
amount. 
As a check, let us apply this working picture to Berkshire 
Hathaway. Can we use it to explain Warren Buffett 's  situation of 
low debt/ 1 7  no dividends at the parent level ,  substantial dividends 
from wholly-owned subsidiaries ,  and satisfied shareholders? We 
can. We see at once that the real anomaly here i s  that, empire 
building and high returns, for once, work in tandem. Given that, a 
low level of debt is rational-why take the risk if no additional 
performance incentive is necessary? For the same reason , steady 
dividends have no governance function to serve at Berkshire. They 
might serve an informational function, for Berkshire certainly 
presents a situation of information asymmetry. Special factors 
ameliorate the information problem in this case-first, Buffett's 
unusual reputation as an investor, and, second, his practice of writ­
ten reports to shareholders on the discretionary subject matter as 
to which managers and corporate reports usually are silent. 
4. Noncontractibility and Legal Mandates 
The incomplete contracts models '  distinction between noncon­
tractible and contractible corporate events and their identification 
of control transfer as the central mode of agent control also ad­
vance our understanding of an essential aspect of the structure of 
corporate law. Corporate l aw usually is enabling, but sometimes is 
mandatory , and contractibility appears to be implicated in the 
p lacement of the line between the two. Default rules that look to­
ward contractual solutions tend to apply to contractible subject 
matter. TI1e legal institutions of control transfer-the federal 
control transfer devices wi l l  be formulated.  and the takeover and proxy contest wil l  be 
brought into the incomplete contracts descript ion in  the future.  
1 1 7 See Low ENSTE I N .  supra note l .  a t  272-73.  
l l 
1 
j j 
! 
j I j 1 
! i 
1997] DIVIDENDS 449 
bankruptcy regime and the federal-state regimes for proxy con­
tests , mergers , and takeovers-present a contrast. They are thick 
with mandates ,  many of them contract invalidating. 
The dividend occupies an awkward place in this scheme. Since 
dividend and reinvestment policy determines the payment stream 
on common, it plays a significant role in shaping incentives that 
determine the operation of the corporation 's mandatory control 
transfer institutions. Yet its unregulated status is fully consonant 
with a larger pattern, for debt incurrence is a business judgment 
matter also. Assuming that past institutional evolution assures the 
appearance of all feasible regulatory solutions to basic governance 
problems, it would seem to follow that no additional regulation of 
dividends feasibly can be interpolated because this subject matter 
is noncontractible .  The robustness of this proposition is considered 
in this Article 's  third and final part. 
I I I .  LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCTIVE DIVIDEND AND 
REINVESTMENT DECISIONS:  AN INCOMPLETE 
CoNTRACTS EvALUATION 
Do the incomplete contracts models, having offered a plausi­
ble description of famil iar institutions, provide any insights as to 
how to improve them? At first inspection, they appear strongly to 
ratify present institutional arrangements . In corporate l aw, the div­
idend is the ultimate redoubt of management discretion, so long as 
management observes the formality of never publicly stating that 
the pursuit of private benefits really motivates its policy. 1 1 8 The 
standard explanation for this rule of discretion fol lows from the 
core insight of the incomplete contracts approach-that dividend 
and reinvestment decisions depend on decisions that follow from 
unobservable and unverifiable variables . Further inspection com­
plicates the analysis, however. These models supply a productivity 
explanation for observed dividend practice without taking the ad­
ditional step of asserting that the practice should be presumed to 
be optimal. TI1ey thereby implicate a theoretical possibil i ty that an 
institutional reform , whether the result of contractual evolution or 
state intervention, could improve matters . They even signal a strat­
egy for the design of such a reform when they use the debt con­
tract 's payme nt mandate to cure the problem of noncontractibility. 
As Hart points out, a mandatory dividend could have a similar ef.· 
1 1 1' "I11e classic case is Dodge v. Ford !Yforor Co . .  1 7 0  N . W. 668 ( M ich. l 9 1 9) .  
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fect . 1 1 9  More generally, the institution of the dividend might be 
more productive if it took on some of the characteristics of debt. 
Three strategies directed to the improvement of dividend and 
reinvestment policy appear in the legal literature: first, mandatory 
payout of earnings at the shareholders' option; second, dialogic in­
tervention by activist institutional investors or their agents; and 
third, stepped up disclosure mandates. The discussion that fol lows 
evaluates each of the three in l ight of learning from the incomplete 
contracts models. 1 20 
A.  Mandatory Payout of Earnings at the Shareholders ' Option 
Zohar Goshen/2 1  expanding on an earlier suggestion made by 
Merritt Fox,  1 2 2  recommends that public corporation shareholders 
be accorded a right to receive a pro rata share of each year's earn­
ings in cash, or, in the alternative , to receive a pro rata stock divi­
dend that in effect reinvests a pro rata share of earnings. 1 23 
Goshen offers a multi-step argument in support of this 
mandatory dividend option. Shareholders, he says, are unlikely to 
make suboptimal dividend and reinvestment decisions ; therefore , a 
dividend option will cause capital to move in the direction of its 
best use . 1 24 The option would not cause material disruption to 
existing corporate financing practices, provided of course that man­
agement has been doing a good job of reinvesting earnings. Since 
the stock price already reflects the expected return on such a com­
pany's stock, each investor in the shareholder group presumably is 
satisfied with the rate of return; holders dissatisfied with the return 
already will have sold. So where legitimate growth prospects are 
on offer (or where no growth is on offer but a level of internally 
generated working capital is necessary to maintain cash flows) ,  the 
shareholders can be expected to grasp the maximizing course and 
I I 9 See supra text  accompanying note 87. 
1 2o There i s .  of  course. a fourth strategy-the takeover. Th is s trategy i s  inevi tably ac­
companied by a supplemental  strategy for increasing the incidence of i ts employment i n  
pract i ce-the removal of  state ant i - takeover legislat ion. S ince i t s  advantages a n d  d isad­
van tages are exhaustively d iscussed e lsewhere. it is omitted from the present d iscussion. 
1 2 1 See Goshen.  supra note 5.  a t  903-06. 
i 22 See M E R R iT  B. Fox. FIN.-\NCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFOR'VIANCE IN A DYNJ\i'vi iC 
ECONO M Y  383-400 ( 1987).  
1 23 See Goshen ,  supra note 5 .  a t  906-09. 
1 24 See id. at 905-06. Goshen points out that  implementat ion of the option presupposes 
an overhaul of the tax system. Under present law. the retaining shareholder pays ordinary 
i ncome t ax on the stock dividend. See id. at 906- 1 7. 
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permit earnings retention . 1 25 Of course,  some firms reinvest 
suboptimally; as to these an increase in the amount of firm borrow­
ing can be expected. But, as Goshen points out, the bonding effect 
of a dividend option is less than that entailed in any such conse­
quent borrowing. This is because the payout mandate bound up in 
the dividend option is contingent on the existence of earnings, un­
like the absolute minimum performance bound up in the promise 
to pay . 1 26 
Goshen sees only one serious problem with a shareholder divi­
dend option. Coordination problems could cause shareholders to 
force a payout above the minimal reinvestment amount necessary 
to preserve the business . 1 27 He  makes a technical adjustment in 
order to solve this problem. Each shareholder who opts for reten­
tion does so conditioned on a minimum percentage of other share­
holders deciding to do the same thing; failure to meet the 
shareholder 's  stated threshold cancels the retention decision. Each 
shareholder thus will "reveal her true retention preference and 
avoid reinvesting in a firm with insufficient working capital . " 1 28 
1 .  Advantages 
Goshen makes no reference to incomplete contracts models of 
capital structure . 129 Indeed, his operative assumptions approach 
those of a complete information model .  Everyone grasps the cru­
cial information respecting value because the stock price accurately 
impounds all information. Furthermore , he recommends the divi­
dend option because it releases cash flows for reallocation by ac­
tors in secondary trading markets, not because it directs particular 
corporations toward an optimal incentive structure . Despite this, 
the dividend option has some appeal from an incomplete contracts 
perspective. 
1 2s Some difference of opinion as to the prospects for the rate of return on reinvested 
sums will  be inevitable. and not unhea lthy . See id. 920-2 1 .  
I 2o See id. a t  904. 
1 27 See id. at 92 1 -25. 
1 2s !d. at 924-25. 
I 2Y B ut he does of  necessity reject the Modigl ian i-l'vl i l ler  hypothesis. I f  dividend l evels .  
investment policies, and firm value were i ndependen t  of  one another. then dividend op­
t ions presumably would make no d ifference. A management required to  pay out all earn­
ings but which wanted to make a given investment would simply borrow the money and 
the end result vvou ld  be the same as that fol lowing re investment .  
Recen t  empirical s tudies of  dividend pol icy support the idea that div idends and invest­
men t  policy arc indeed dependent on one another. See David A .  Louton & Dale L. 
Domian , Dividends and lnvestmenL Further E111pirical Evidence. Q.J.  Bus.  & EcoN . . 
Spring 1 995. at 53.  
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The advantage lies in the debt-like aspect that the option 
brings to the dividend payment stream. The step in the direction of 
debt lies in the creation of a constant possibility of a mandated 
payout : Depending on the shareholders ' preferences respecting a 
payment stream, common stock has the potential to be an income 
bond without a maturity date. Although the option does not ac­
cord shareholders contingent control of the business (in a sense 
they already have it by virtue of their voting power) , it does pro­
vide them contingent control of the portion of cash flows deter­
mined to be net earnings under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles ("GAAP") . Problems of noncontractibility are avoided 
through the combination of the reference over to GAAP and the 
vesting of absolute discretion in the shareholders. 1 30 
The dividend option also has advantages when compared to 
high leverage as a solution to the problem suboptimal investment 
of free cash flows. As shown above , high leverage solves the prob­
lem absolutely subject to a long list of problems and costs. The 
dividend option builds in more flexibility, since it leaves the disci­
plinary decision to ongoing shareholder evaluation. Recall that 
Hart argues to the contrary, making a case for the superiority of 
debt over dividends. He bases that case, however, entirely in the 
context of a two period model .  Debt, he says, imports discipline 
across the model's entire time frame, where a mandatory and large 
dividend only can operate at t = 1 . 1 3 1 The dividend option reveals 
that Hart misses a point. The corporate dividend and reinvestment 
problem arises on an open-ended time frame, and a dividend op­
tion, unlike a short- or long-term debt contract, spurs productivity 
across that indefinite succession of time periods. 1 32 It also heeds 
the warning that borrowing carries intrinsic risks. Unlike a fixed 
payment, the dividend option can be relaxed during cyclical or 
other downturns. And in situations where discipline is needed, the 
option forces managers who wish to expand their empires to incur 
more debt. 
A dividend option also would materially alter management's 
incentives respecting disclosure of information about investment 
1 3 1 l Management .  o f  course. thereby acqu ires a cos tly incen t ive t o  manipula te G AAP to 
minim ize reported earn ings and thereby protect cash t1ows from shareho l der access. See 
supra note 88. B u t  these costs arguably would be modesi . The existing acco u n ting system 
de l i mi ts them. and the benefi t  of more productive investmen t  practices would counterbal­
ance them. 
1 3 1 See supra note 1 00 and accompanying text .  
l 32 Of course a conso! bond. l ike a d ividend opt ion . could extend across an i n definite 
succession of periods. 
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policy. In the incomplete contracts framework, stock prices do not 
unilaterally (and heroically) solve problems of information asym­
metry, and management lacks incentives to disclose its knowledge 
about its investment pol icy. Given a dividend option , the zone of 
discretion to withhold information would shrink. Hypothesize a 
firm falling into Graham and Dodd's middle or low level growth 
category. 133 Its shareholders would treat a management earnings 
retention request with some skepticism . If its managers wished to 
maintain or increase their stocks of retained equity capital, they 
presumably would be forced to mount a road show-taking their 
case out of the boardroom-and make credible presentations re­
specting anticipated project returns and costs of capital to the 
shareholders. Enduring information asymmetries thus would be 
ameliorated, if not cured. The talk would be cheap , but at least 
there would be talk. 
2. Shortcomings 
Incomplete contracts theory lends the foregoing support to the 
dividend option with only one hand, however. It  uses its other to 
withdraw the support. The withdrawal stems from informational 
problems. 
a .  Information Asymmetries 
If this subject matter were contractible, the problem of subop­
timal reinvestment could be solved with a charter provision stating 
that the corporation' s  agents shall approve no investments as to 
which r < k. But, because the subject matter is noncontractible ,  
such a provision would be unenforceable for al l  intents and pur­
poses. How would a shareholder plaintiff prove an alleged breach? 
Investment is a matter of valuation, and valuation is an intrinsically 
speculative exercise .  The appraiser projects a stream of future cash 
flows, and then discounts them to present value by ascertaining and 
applying a required rate of return. Contemporary business prac­
tice makes available a range of methodologies for ordering such an 
inquiry, faci l itating a degree of objectification of the framework for 
analysis. The required rate of return, for example, can be hard­
ened by reference to n umbers generated by comparable firms. But 
such hard numbers never come with a guarantee of accuracy-they 
are by definition generated in the past by different actors , and can 
only be applied based on the assumption that the future being pro-
t33 See supra notes 1 7 - l S  and accornpanving text .  
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j ected will repeat that past experience . Some such assumptions are 
safer than others . And even in the safest case a relatively hard 
number is in the end only applied to a soft projection. In the real 
world of capital and investment, valuation ultimately depends on 
the judgment of the actor in control of the asset. 
When tested ex post by a legal decision maker, such a valua­
tion judgment at best can only be measured against a range of 
plausible results , and then only at considerable cost . There is no 
litmus test. This means that even if particulars respecting m anage­
ment investment decisions were observable-and they are not 
under prevailing disclosure practices-it would not fol low that 
suboptimal choices could be proved reliably. The bad faith actor is 
difficult to detect; even a long sequence of suboptimal returns 
could be put down to overly optimistic proj ections or subsequent 
bad luck, rather than to consciously suboptimal reinvestment poli­
cies. Corporate law thus has good reasons for remitting these deci­
sions to the realm of discretion. Where judicial scrutiny of 
financial policy does occur, as with certain mergers, 134 the impossi­
bility of verification causes review to be process-based. That is ,  the 
reviewing authority does a circumstantial check only, looking to 
see whether the deciding corporate agent appeared to be doing a 
conscientious, disinterested job. 
As noted, the dividend option obviates the verification prob­
lem by giving each shareholder absolute decisional power. The 
problem is that shareholders thus empowered still cannot observe 
the firm's set of new investment opportunities .  A management 
group, once pressed, can attempt to ameliorate this asymmetry 
through disclosure . But, as also noted, that talk still would be 
cheap. The disclosing managers would be interested in the out­
come, and verification would be expensive and unreliable. Share­
holder choices respecting dividend options would not differ 
structurally from the choices shareholders already face when they 
buy and sell stocks. How then can these outside investors be ex­
pected to do the best possible job of ascertaining the quantum of r 
> k investments available to the firm? 
Goshen asserts that they can, assuming that the shareholders '  
attention will be  focused by  their staked capital and the possibil ity 
of gain and loss. The managers , in contrast, suffer the disadvantage 
U-+ See, e.g, . Cinerama. Inc .  v. Techn icolor. Inc . . 663 A.2d l l 56 (Del .  1 995 ) ( d iscussing 
the duty of  care of  directors of  a l inn acquired in  fr iendly merger): Weinbe rger v .  UOP. 
I nc . . 457 A.2d 701 (De l .  l 983) (discussing the duty of loyal ty of d irectors o f  subsidiary 
merging into parent) .  
·i j 
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of playing for private benefit. Against this assertion we can bring 
to bear every factor pointed to in the literature of stock market 
pricing imperfections. In the noise-trading counter story , 1 35 many 
stockholders can be expected to look backwards to the immediate 
past and chase trends. Perverse projections follow immediately. 
Given widespread trend chasing and a dividend option, the high 
growth firm of the recent past would retain all earnings , while the 
middle or low level firm would pay everything out. A group of 
decisionmakers thus biased could not possibly make first-best 
decisions . 1 36 
But might such shareholders still do a better job than manag­
ers biased by pursuit of private benefits? Perhaps, if the only pri­
vate benefit pursued by the managers was the empire builder's 
satisfaction of asset control .  But today's management incentive 
picture appears to be somewhat more complex. Managers also de­
rive private benefits from reputations for effective performance. 
Where twenty years ago such a reputation depended on company 
growth, evaluations today are keyed to shareholder value. Reputa­
tional incentives accordingly tend to encourage more care in the 
choice of new investment opportunities. The problem of subop­
timal reinvestment has not gone away, but it is hard to predict that 
an under-informed shareholder with a pure financial incentive will 
make reinvestment decisions superior to those of a better-informed 
manager with a complex of motives. One suspects that results 
would vary from company to company-some deadwood manage­
ment teams would get a dose of needed discipline , and other con­
scientious and talented teams would be forced to borrow more 
than an optimal amount or simply to pass on good opportunities ,  
the value of which proved difficult to communicate credibly. 1 37 
1 3 5  See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H .  Summers, The Noise Trader Approach w Fi­
nance, J. EcoN. PERSP . .  Spring 1 990, at 19, 19-22. 
t 3o For a recent empirical study supporting th is point, see Josef Lakonishok et a l . .  Con ­
!rarian !nvesrmenr, Exrrapolation, and Risk, 4 9  J .  FrN. 1 54 1  ( 1 994) (arguing t h a t  s ta t is t ical 
analysis of stock prices and returns over time suggesting that investors in · 'glamour '· � tocks 
suffer from a cognitive l imitation).  
t37 We could make Goshen 's mandate more situation-sensitive by making its presence 
contingent on a stat istical signal that dist inguishes firms with extraordinary inves tment op­
portunity sets from !inns with suboptimal sets. That is. all public firms would start l i fe 
without the dividend opt ion. which would be triggered by the occurrence o f  the s ignal-in 
effect at r = I .  Any number of concrete events suggest themselves as appropriate identi l l ­
ers o f  this sort  of corporate maturity-two o r  three years of earnings growth below a level  
fi xed by reference to current market  condit ions, or perhaps a stock price stal led or fal l ing 
in relation to some larger index. Any signal chosen would carry some imperfections. and 
also be in danger of obsolescence given changing conditions. But a rough separation of  
sheep and goa ts presumably could be engineered. In the encl. however.  this modification 
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b. Perverse Incentives 
The dividend option promises to take us closer to a first-best 
corporate investment practice by removing the dividend and rein­
vestment decision from the influence of private benefit pursuit by 
transferring it to a set of decision makers possessing purely finan­
cial incentives. 138 In making this promise, Goshen follows con­
tractarian theory to assume the aggregate of shareholders provides 
a perfect proxy for the maximizing firm. The incomplete contracts 
approach, in contrast, depicts each class of outside interest holder 
in a distinct governance incentive posture that follows from the 
terms of the holders' payment stream. Given such a picture , ques­
tions arise respecting the incentives of under-informed,  option­
holding shareholders. 
To access these questions, let us look once again at Warren 
Buffett. He stands out among American investment managers not 
just as a bargain-hunter, but as a bargain-hunter patient enough to 
wait for the business cycle to turn before buying. The herd, in con­
trast, is famous for pulling up stakes when the equity averages go 
south and reinvesting in debt securities to weather the cyclical 
shock. How, given such a behavior pattern, would a dividend op­
tion work? One possibility is that investors who chose reinvest­
ment in good times would change their options in bad times ,  taking 
advantage of the debt-like characteristic of their holdings. 
Although they would not bootstrap themselves into bankruptcy 
priority in extremely bad times,  they still would see an increase in 
periodic income that partially would cover cyclical stock price 
reverses. An institutional holder, such as a bank or insurance com­
pany, experiencing a cyclical round of defaults on debt invest­
ments, would have a similar incentive. The managers of the 
company thus optioned would be grappling with a recession and 
the consequent tightening of lenders' credit standards . They might 
be squeezed indeed. Such a squeeze, taking a toll on the stock 
price , would not make a switch from earnings retention to a cash 
option irrational from the point of view of an individual share­
holder. Unlike a manager, this actor has an ever-present exit op­
tion. Playing chicken and testing the patience of the rest of the 
shareholder group might very well make sense ; if the game fails on 
the first round, the stock can be sold. 
reduces t he  problem of  uninformed shareholder choice on ly  by  reducing the n umber and 
type of firms subject to the option. The substance of  the problem remains. 
t 3X G iven perfect information. only managers with perfect incentive compensa t ion con­
tracts could do as good a job. 
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Product market competition also could give rise to unexpected 
problems. Bol ton and Scharfstein have a model showing that an 
endogenous financial constraint imposed to assure that a firm does 
not divert resources to itself, in their case short-term borrowing, 
can be costly in a competitive environment. The financial con­
straint gives the firm's rivals a predatory incentive. They step up 
the price competition, and thereby increase the chance that the 
firm's lenders cut off funding, inducing its premature exit. 13" Pay­
out of all or most corporate earnings, taken alone, would be un­
likely to lead to this dire consequence. B ut it could make a 
significant causal contribution. For example, if the shareholders 
opted to take an amount greater than that needed to sustain the 
business, the firm's debt level would become suboptimally high 
with resulting vulnerability in the product market .  Even if the debt 
was not excessive in theory, predatory conduct by other firms could 
make it excessive in fact . Alternatively, management groups facing 
a world in which equity financing implies an unstable claim on firm 
cash flows might resolve doubts in favor of higher proportions of 
debt financing, thereby suboptimally exposing themselves to dis­
tress in the event of product market reverses. 
Finally, a dividend option could be  a vehicle for shareholder 
self-dealing in some situations. Large block share he · Jers particu­
larly might have incentives to opt for cash, thereby se ·, Jing a signal 
to other shareholders to do the same thing. They might, in so do­
ing, soften up the firm and its stock price for a later takeover or 
partial combination. 1 40 
B .  Noncontractibility and Intervention by Institutional Investors 
The mandatory shareholder vote for the board of directors is 
corporate l aw's primary response to the problem of noncontrac­
tibility. The vote is a contingent control transfer device. Since in­
cumbents may be terminated for any or no reason, no problems of 
observability or verifiability are implicated .  Of course, control is 
transferred to a group of replacement agents rather than to an­
other class of security holder, as occurs upon default on borrowing. 
B ut,  presumably, the replacement agents get control on an under­
taking to step up the payment stream on the equity. The real prob-
1 39 See Patrick Bolton & David S .  Scharfstein, A Theory of Predation Based on Agency 
Proble111s in Financial Contracting, 80 A M .  EcoN. REv. 93 ( 1 990) . 
1 -1! 1 See Jeffrey N .  Gordon. Shareholder lnirimive and Delegation: A Social Choice and 
Came The01·eric Approach ro Corporare Law, 60 U. CrN. L.  REv. 347, 376-81 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
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lem with the vote lies in the inhibiting effect of economic and legal 
barriers to collective action by shareholders . 14 1  
Imagine a world i n  which shareholders used their votes to 
elect activist board representatives ,  and in which managers as a re­
sult lived in constant fear of replacement. D ividend and reinvest­
ment policy presumably would be a primary focus for such 
directors. Problems of observability would still surface. Board­
room presence , taken alone, does not give an outside director facts 
with which to expose a suboptimal investment project , for example .  
But ,  armed with even a modicum of technical expertise, such direc­
tors could be expected to subject the credibility of management's 
investment program to plausible inspection. Such intense monitor­
ing, together with a politics of corporate tenure , could materially 
lessen the intensity of the dividend and reinvestment problem, 
avoiding some of the perverse effects of the blunt-edged control 
transfer devices modeled in the incomplete contracts literature. 
1 .  The Institutional Shareholder Movement 
The initiation of such a monitoring regime is the core objective 
of the institutional shareholder movement. Its strategists have of­
fered plans for cost effective shareholder-initiated monitoring of 
noncontractible corporate affairs and negotiation (contractual and 
otherwise) of reductions of the costs of management influence142 
within the firm. Given certain legal adjustments, the strategists 
have said, prospects for financial gain by themselves will induce 
governance initiatives by institutional investors . 1 43 In the alterna-
1 4 1 Historically. shareholders of public companies are an O lsonian latent  group. See 
Edward B .  Rock. The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Jnstitwional Shareholder Ac­
tivlsnz .  79 GEo. L.J. 445, 455-59 ( 1 991) .  I n  other words, a collect ive good-active monitor­
ing of management-would make them better off given proportionate distribution of its 
costs. but the law provides no cost sharing mechanism, and the free rider problem prevents 
the e mergence of a volunteer or group of volunteers with an incentive to provide the good. 
Given dispersed shareholdings, the nontrivial costs of active monitoring, and the a lterna­
tive of exit  through sale,  the benefits obtainable  without investment in monitoring exceed 
the bene fits obtainable from investment.  See id. at 455-56. In addition, ration al apathy can 
prevail when the system mandate s  that matters be presented for shareholder a pproval .  
The rational  small  shareholder does not invest  in  information respecting governance mat­
ter s .  given the l ik elihood that the collective action problem prevents a n  e ffective group 
response.  See Joseph A.  Grundfest,  Jusr Vote No: A Minimalist Straregy for Dealing wirh 
Barburiuns !mide rhe Gates. 45 STAN.  L. REv. 857. 910 ( 1 993) .  As Edlin & S tiglitz, supra 
note l l l .  at 130 1 .  comment, the puzzle for solution here is the existence of any manage­
ment discipli nary effect at  a l l .  
t -->2 See Paul Milgram & John Roberts. A n  Economic Approach t o  !nfluence Activities in 
Orguni::.arions. 94 AM.  J .  Soc. S l 54, S 1 56 (Supp. 1 988) . 
1 43 Col lect ive action theory allows for the possibi l i ty that a subgroup of a latent  group 
wil l  organ ize and provide for the public good if the benefits from action to each member of 
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tive, institutional votes could be used to nominate and elect expert 
outside monitors , 144 and the increased incidence of the placement 
of substantial b locks of shares with Buffett-like institutional 
owners. 145 
Unfortunately, no volunteers have appeared to make the fi­
nancial investments necessary for real world testing of these ambi­
tious proposals. 1 46 Instead, institutional initiatives against badly­
managed firms have taken the form of discrete, issue-based voting 
contests that focus on short term results . 1 47 Such exercises have 
low out-of-pocket costs and appear to be driven by the selective 
incentive of reputation rather than by a pure financial incentive . 
The leadership role has been taken by a narrow segment of institu­
tional agents-public pension fund managers whose indexed port­
folios reduce their share of immediate financial returns, but whose 
independence from management influence creates a possibil ity for 
reputational enhancement through constructive anti-managerial 
the subgroup exceed the costs incurred. See RussELL HARDIN, CoLLECTIVE AcTION 4 1  
( 1 982) .  Increased concentration o f  shareholdings i n  institutional h ands makes i t  conce iva­
ble that investment in monitoring might be cost beneficial  for institutional subgroups. See 
B ernard S.  B lack, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MrcH. L. REv. 520. 525 ( 1 990 ) .  
Concentration also promises to mit igate the rational  apathy problem. The decision 
whether to become informed about the governance issue depends on the costs and ex­
pected benefits of the effort and the initiative's probabil ities of success. 1l1e cost is in­
dependent of the number of shares held.  With individual shareholders holding larger 
proportionate stakes, the expected returns from a given information investment go up, as 
does the proponent's probability of success. See id. at 585-89. 
Subgroup formation depends on the size of the group. the cost of action. and the 
magnitude of the benefit to be obtained. Proponents of law reform to faci l i tate share­
holder participation direct most of their attention to the fi rst  two factors. Since the 
number of members needed to form a subgroup declines as ownership concentration goes 
up, the proponents argue for relaxation of regulatory b arriers that impede the accumula­
t ion of large holdings in given firms by single investors or organized groups of investors. 
See id. at 579-80. The proponents also circulate blueprints for cheap strategies. since . as 
the costs of a given initiative go down, subgroup formation can go forward with a l ower 
level of concentration and a lower projected probabil ity of success. See Grund fcst. supra 
note 1 4 1 .  at 927 (explaining minimum cost strategy of "just vote no" campaigns ) .  
l 44 See Ronald J .  Gi lson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinvellling the Outside Direcror: An 
Agenda for !nstiwtional Investors. 43  STAN. L .  REv.  863 ( 1 991 ) [hereinafter G ilson & 
Kraakman, The Owside Director]; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Jnsritwions as Re/arionaf fri vl!s!ors: A 
New Look at Cumulative Voring, 94 CoLUi\-1.  L. REv. 1 24.  1 33-42 ( 1 994) . 
1 45 See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relarional ln vesring and Agency Theory. L'i C;R­
oozo L.  REv. 1 033 ( 1 994); Ronald J .  Gilson & Reinier Kraakman. fnvesrmcnr Co111pun ies 
As Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the iv!SJC in rhe Cotporate Governance De bare. 45 
STAN. L. REV. 985 ( 1 993) .  
1 46 See William W. B ratton & Joseph A. i'vlcCahery. Regularory Competition. Regularorr 
Capture. and Corporate Se!f-Regulution. 73 N.C.  L. R�o.v. 1 86 1 .  1 904-06 ( 1 995 ) .  
1 47 See Robert C. Pozen. Institutional In vestors: The Relucranr Activists. H ,c\RV.  B us.  
REv. ,  Jan. -Feb. 1 994, at 1 4 1 , 1 45 -46. 
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political activity. 148 They have had some successes . Their commu­
nicative courses of action have prompted preemptive negotiations 
and concessions by managers, and, in some cases the termination 
of the chief executive by the outside directors . 1 49 
These shareholder threats are credible because they impact on 
the reputational interests of chief executives and independent 
board members . A campaign, by its very existence, declares that 
the target executives possess undesirable characteristics , 150 de­
tracting from their standing in the business community, 1 5 1  and in 
some cases, their marketability. Extraordinary risk aversion to 
such reputational impairment can be expected on the managers ' 
J48 These events confirm the predictions made by the theoretical counter story. Even 
given legal adj ustments. governance init iatives realizing the ful l  promise of cooperative 
gain through enforced self-regulation cannot be expected .  Two points are emphasized. 
First, agency relationships within investment institutions create disincentives that prevent 
subgroup formation. even assuming a projection of a positive return to the subgroup from 
an investment in governance. Since the individual manager's performance is  measured 
against the performance of the market as a whole and subgroup investment benefits the 
market as a whole, successful governance investments do not necessari ly improve the indi­
vidual manager's 1=-erformance profile. See Rock, supra note 141 ,  at  473-74. Second. the 
benefits of cost-intensive relationa l  investment remain underspecified. In  theory. these l ie 
in informational access and ongoing constructive criticism by the institutional monitor. In 
practice, underperforming companies are publicly identified in the ordinary course, and 
standard remedies respecting investment policies, incentive schemes, and governance 
structures are part of  the conventional wisdom. To the extent that institutions cheaply can 
tie the communication of these points to credible threats against target managers, the avail­
able set of governance benefits can be secured through discrete engagement. Incentives 
for more substant ia l  investments in ongoing relationships remain specula tive. absent a spe­
cial technical capabi l i ty on the part of the particular monitor. As a result, risks of perverse 
incentives and commitment problems come to the fore of the relational picture. A strate­
gical ly placed institutional holder coul d  opt for side payments from management in prefer­
ence to public-regarding informationa l  development, or, given a hostile tender offer, the 
institu tions in the subgroup could defect from an implicit undertaking to m anagement to 
be patient. See generally Ayres & Cramton, supra note 1 45;  Edward B .  Rock, Controlling 
the D ark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L REv. 987 (1994) .  
1 49 The means of access is the precatory shareholder proposal, a medium for nonbind­
ing, shareholder-init iated voting proposals made available by preemptive m andate under 
federal proxy rule 1 4a-8. Institutions began m aking these proposals in the late 1 980s in 
reaction to expanding legal constraints on takeovers. The first generation of proposals  
concerned poison pi l ls .  but in subsequent years the subject broadened to cover the share­
holder voting process. and process and structure rules designed to make boards more effec­
tive in monitoring and  designing incentive arrangements. See Gilson & Kraakman. The 
Outside D irector, supra note 1 44, at 868; see also Grundfest. supra note 1 4 1 .  at 93 1 .  In the 
alternative, the proponent announces performance dissatisfaction di rectly and invites 
others to concur by voting no on management proposals. See Grund fest. supra note 1 4 1 .  at 
931 . 
1 50 See Grundfest. supra note 1 4 1. at 927-28. 
1 5 1  Cf James G .  March & Zur Shapira. Managerial Perspeuives on Risk and Risk Tak­
ing, 33 MG 1\tT. SCI .  1 404. 1 4 1 3  ( 1 987) (stating that managers are concerned about their 
reputa tions for risk-taking). 
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part, if, as seems reasonable, we can assume that their employment 
contracts, like investment contracts, are incomplete. With execu­
tives, incompleteness means that the contract does not ful ly com­
pensate for tenure insecurity and the costs of changing jobs. 1 52 
More broadly, the appearance of a vocal shareholder interest 
group changes the manager's institutional environment. The insti­
tutions articulate a normative challenge to the manager's conduct 
of the business . Their challenge has a more destabilizing effect 
than ordinary external criticism, due to their equity investments, 
long-term presence , and ability to marshal votes respecting both 
present and future matters for shareholder action. They represent 
an unstable sector in the l arger domain of institutional relation­
ships with which the manager deals . By negotiating, the risk averse 
manager  seeks  to s t ab i l iz e ,  and ,  hopefu l l y ,  influence  the  
relationship. 1 53 
2.  Dividends and Institutional Investors 
Two well-publicized exceptions to the general rule that the in­
vestor activists fight their battles in the form of discrete issue-based 
voting contests should be noted here. These are the Carl Icahn­
Bennett LeBow proxy fight at RJR Nabisco and Kirk Kerkorian's 
campaign to gain representation on the Chrysler board. Each bat­
tle concerned dividend policy, and each was led by a large block 
holder pursuing an extraordinary short-term return on a common 
stock investment. More particularly, the Icahn-LeBow proxy con­
test was a step in a larger campaign to pressure RJR to separate its 
food and tobacco businesses by means of a spin-off. Kerkorian, in 
contrast, sought an extraordinary cash dividend, targeting a huge 
pot of cash-amounting to $7.5 billion-accumulated by Chrysler 
as a reserve to finance the retooling of its production platform dur­
ing the automobile industry's next cyclical downturn. Icahn and 
LeBow lost their proxy context; 1 54 Kerkorian and Chrysler settled, 
1 52 See M ilgram & Roberts, supra note 1 42, a t  S l 58-59. 
1 53 See March & Shapira. supra note 1 5 1 .  at 1414 .  
1 54 The sequence of events was as fol lows. LeBow received FTC approval to purchase 
up to 1 5 %  of RJR's stock on the open market in August 1995.  I n  early October 1 995 .  
LeBow announced a partnership with Car l  Icahn to purchase a 4.8% s take in  RJ R. LeBow 
then waged and won a nonbind ing consen t sol ici tat ion of RJR shareholders to compel RJ R 
to spin off the Nabisco food uni t  in February 1 996. RJR countered to appease restless 
inst i tut ional  i nvestors by i ncreasing i t s  d ividend 23% and setting a stock buy back objec­
t ive. LeBow then made what i s  taken to be a tactical error. He announced a proposed 
sett lement of several tobacco l iab i l i ty suits pending against his own tobacco company. Lig­
gett. That sett lement caused tobacco stocks to decl ine across-the-board. LeBow conceded 
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with Kerkorian getting a representative on the board and a divi­
dend increase, but with management retaining its war chest . 1 55 
The present interest of these cases l ies in the absence in each 
of serious problems of observation and verification, despite a focus 
on a dividend proposal . Each case was easily stated, without a 
need to review a complex valuation process. In addition, each of 
RJR's food and tobacco combination and Chrysler's war chest was 
in plain sight. RJR presents the more typical case of the two . 
Spin-offs and other forms of corporate unbundling are , along with 
CEO termination, primary items on the institutional investor 
agenda. 156 Indeed, the frequent occurrence of corporate un­
bundling through spin-offs in recent years 1 57 demonstrates both the 
rise in shareholder influence and the concomitant shift in the 
reputational influences on managers . 
Contrariwise, the spin-off's very prominence on observed in­
stitutional investor agendas demonstrates the restrictive effect of 
information asymmetries .  Direct assaults on periodic retention de-
defeat  in the RJR proxy contest one month later.  See Suein L. Hwang & Steven Lipin. 
LeBow Quits Fight to Win RJ R Control, WALL ST. J . .  Apr. 1 7 . 1 996. at A3. 
The fight is not yet over. As of this writ ing. lcahn. h aving dissolved his p artnership 
with LeBow, h as renewed the fight for a spin-off of the Nabisco food group. conducting 
meetings with RJ R management and threatening to call a special shareholders '  meeting. 
See Icahn Is Trying A gain to Force RJ R to Split Food, Tobacco Units. WALL ST. J.. Aug. 23. 
1 996, a t  B3. 
1 55 Kerkorian tried several tactics to accomplish his goal of a payout of the  war chest 
over a two year period. First, he  launched and aborted a $20 bi l lion hostile takeover bid.  
See Robert L. Simison et a l . ,  Putting Chrysler in Play. WALL ST. J . .  Apr. 1 4. 1995.  a t  A4. 
Next, he  raised his stake in Chrysler from a 9 .2% stockholding to a 1 3 .6% holding through 
a $700 mil l ion tender offer and threatened a proxy fight.  See G abriel l a  Stern et a l . .  
Chrysler Faces New Pressure from Kerkorian, WALL ST. J . .  June 27. 1 995, a t  A 3 .  I n  the end 
he settled for a five-year standstil l  agreement with the board. See Angelo B. Hende rson & 
G abriel la Stern, Chrysler Corp.,  Kerkorian Reach a Five- Year Truce Agreement, WALL ST. 
J . ,  Feb. 9, 1 996, at A3.  Chrysler. attempting to moll ify Kerkorian. raised dividends five 
times over the two year period. I t  also announced a $2 bil l ion stock buy-back and a two­
for-one stock split .  
The standstill agreement requires Kerkorian to keep his stockholdings below 1 3 . 7 %  
a n d  prohibits him from l aunching a n y  proxy fights o r  takeover attempts. I n  e xchange. 
Chrysler a'greed to the placement of a nominee on Chrysler's board. the announcement of 
an additional share repurchase program. and a change in some corporate governance 
policies. 
1 56 Sometimes the two are combined: a CEO ta rget with a weakening internal political 
b ase resecures his position by announcing a spin-off of a substantial segment of the corpo­
rate group. See, for example, Richard G ibson. Quaker Oats Feeling Pressu re for Big 
Changes in the Wake of rhe Fiz z led Snapple A cquisition . WALL. ST . .1 . .  July 25 .  1 996. at C2. 
recommending a spin off of Quaker Oats beverage business: ·· Some investors a re bett ing 
that Quaker Oats Chairman B il l  Smithburg must act soon to bolster Quaker's s tock price if  
he  doesn ' t  want to become Cap'n Crunched . ' '  
1 57 See Steven Lipin & Randall Smith. Spinoff's Flourisli. Fueled B v  Tax Status. fn vesror 
Pressure, and Stock Performance, WALL. ST. L June 1 .5 .  1 99.5.  at C l .  
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cisions are uncommon-Kerkorian's attack on Chrysler's war chest 
is the only well-publicized case. A spin-off provides an indirect 
route to a similar end, one that surmounts the information prob­
lem. To see this point, we can turn once again to the writings of 
Warren Buffett. Suboptimal dividend and earnings retention deci­
sions, he says, are particularly likely where the managers of an out­
standing business add other businesses to the corporate entity: 
Many corporations that consistently show good returns 
both on equity and on overall incremental capital have . . .  em­
ployed a large portion of their retained earnings on an economi­
cally unattractive,  even disastrous, basis. Their marvelous core 
businesses . . .  camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation 
elsewhere . . . . The managers at fault periodically report on 
the lesson they have learned from the latest disappointment. 
They then usually seek out future lessons. 158 
To push for a spin-off, then, is to push for a corporate structure that 
presents a lesser likelihood of suboptimal earnings retention. An 
immediate payoff in the form of an increased stock price also can 
be expected. 
3. Law Reform 
If it became the practice for institutions to nominate and e lect 
their own board representatives, direct challenges to questionable 
dividend and reinvestment policies presumably would occur more 
often. Once on the board, the representative at least would have a 
chance to access the relevant information. Any law reform insti­
tuted as a means to promote institutional board representation 159 
thus also promotes more productive dividend and retention 
decisions . 
Pending realization of the full program of relational engage­
ment between institutions and managers, we can expect the institu­
tions to continue the practice of discrete, issue-based engagement 
of managers of poorly performing companies .  Two a lterations in 
the regulatory landscape-one at the federal level and the other at 
the state level-could facilitate increases in the scope and intensity 
of these piecemeal engagements. At the federal level, dividend 
policy could be admitted to the list of subject matter suitable for 
shareholder proposals . 1 60 At the state level ,  standing barriers to 
I :'i S  Buffeu Essuvs . supra note 9 .  at 1 26: see also LowENSTE IN ,  supra note 34, a t  1 24-25. 
! 59 For a l ist of regulat ions s i ngkJ out for amendment or removal, sec Mark J .  Roe, A 
Polirical Theory of A11 1 ericun Corporore Finance. 9 1  CoLUi'vi. L. REv. 1 0 .  26-27 ( 1 991  ) . 
t oo Under Rule 1 4( a )-8( c ) ( L 3 ) . specific amounts of cash or stock dividends are inappro­
priate subject matter for shareh older proposals. ll1e SEC. pursuant  to  this rule, has con-
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shareholder access to the corporate charter could be removed.1 6 1 
Both reforms would increase chances for access to the corporate 
contract for the inclusion of shareholder-initiated terms. Of 
course, in so doing, neither could bring about a quick solution to 
the dividend and reinvestment problem. Since each would be di­
rected to the corporate contract, each would suffer the limitations 
of the existing menu of contracting techniques. The menu contains 
a list of second-best solutions and partial palliatives-most promi­
nently, shareholder payout options , 1 62 set payout percentages, and 
disclosure rules. Despite these limitations, it would be instructive 
to see whether any of these provisions garnered investor support or 
otherwise proved useful to proponents in company-specific con­
texts. And it always remains possible that someone might invent 
an effective regulatory technology in the future . Were that to hap­
pen, corporate l aw's process rules should provide a ready basis for 
its imposition at the shareholders' behest. Even given a first-best 
contractual technology, voluntary management adoption cannot 
safely be predicted. 
C. Mandatory Disclosure 
Warren Buffett comments as fol lows on management commu­
nications respecting dividend and reinvestment decisions: 
Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but sel­
dom explained. A company will say something like , " Our goal 
is to pay out 40 % to 5 0 %  of earni ngs and to increase dividends 
at a rate at least equal to the rise in the CPl . "  And that's it-no 
analysis will be supplied as to why that particular policy is best 
for the owners of the business. Yet allocation of capital is cru­
cial to business and investment management. 1 63 
Indeed it is .  Even now, after six decades of experience with a 
mandatory disclosure system and a decade of experience with 
shareholder activism, meaningful disclosure practices respecting 
dividend and reinvestment decisions have yet to evolve . 1M 
t inual ly  issued no-act ion le tters t o  registrants seeking t o  exclude shareholder proposals 
regarding  the declarat ion of dividends. See. e.g. . Shop Television Network, I n c  . .  SEC No­
Action Le tter.  1 99 1  W L  176906 (S .EC. )  ( May 20. 1 99 1 ) . 
I A I  Or. to the extent  state level reform is impossible because of managemen t  capture of 
the state corporate  lawmaking i ns t i tut ions. the federal government should i n t e rvene to 
mandate such access. See B ra t ton e t  a ! . .  supra note 43. at 1 936-47 . 
I A2 See supra text  accompanying notes 1 2 1 -28.  
1 63 Buffett Essays . supra note 9. at  l23. 
1 64 SEC disclosure requirements perta in ing  to the pavment and declara t ion  of  d iv idends 
are very general .  Regulation S-X requires the registran t  to disclose the amount of the 
di vidends for each class of share. See 17 C.F.R .  � 2 !0.3-04 ( 1 994). The Regulat ion further 
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The noncontractibility of the subject matter explains this in 
part. In the rare case where a manager makes a disclosure about a 
dividend or reinvestment decision, the statement amounts to cheap 
talk because the decisions' bases are unobservable . 1 65 Smart 
money looks for signals with more credibility. The absence of in­
vestor pressure for a more forthcoming practice accordingly makes 
sense. For the rest of the explanation we can look to the SEC's 
early tradition of l imiting the disclosure mandate to hard, verifiable 
information, 1 66 and its more recent problems in constructing a via­
ble safe harbor for projections disclosure. 1 67 Reinvestment deci­
sions are made to finance investments , and investments follow 
from projections . Mandated disclosure of particulars respecting re­
investment decisions thus sounds suspiciously like a mandate to 
disclose internal projections. 
The effect of this rule of nondisclosure-once coupled with the 
state law allocation of utmost business judgment protection-is to 
embed dividend and reinvestment decisions in the deepest and 
darkest corner of the corporate black box. We lack any sense of 
the quality of boardroom practice respecting dividend and rein­
vestment decisions, in contrast to our extensive,  l itigation-gener­
ated knowledge of practice respecting mergers and takeovers. 1 6:::; A 
long list of questions can be asked. Do boards in fact receive peri-
requires that  any restrictions on dividend payments be noted i n  the notes accompanying 
financial statements. See 1 7  C.F.R. § 2 10.4-08( e ) ( 1 )  ( 1 996) . No other significant informa­
tion respecting dividends needs to be reported in periodic financials filed with the SE C . 
See generally Regulation S-X, 1 7  C.F.R. § 210. 1 -0 1  to 2 10.6-07. Regulation S-K requires 
the registrant to disclose cash dividends declared per common share in its selected financial 
data,  and permits the disclosure of any other additional items that  the registrant believes 
would enhance an understanding of other trends in its financial condition. See 1 7  C .F . R . 
§ 229.301 instr. 2 .  
1 65 1l10se skeptical about signalling explanations o f  dividend payout patterns dismiss 
dividend increases themselves as cheap talk. See H arry DeAngelo e t  a l . ,  Reversal of For­
fllne: Dividend Signaling and the D isappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth, 40 J. FtN.  
E coN. 341  ( 1 996) (supporting the conclusion that dividend increases are not systematically 
reliable as sign als) .  
1 o6 For a description of the SEC's historical policy, see George J .  B enston, The Ejfecrive­
ness and Effects of rhe SEC 's A ccounting Disclosure Requireme111s . in EcoNOMIC Poucy 
AND THE REG ULATION OF CoRPORATE SEcURITIES 26-30 ( Henry G. M anne ed. ,  1 969) .  
I h7 Necessitating congressional intervention. See Private Securities Litiga tion Reform 
Act of 1 995, Pub. L. No. 1 04-67 .  § 1 02 .  1 09 Stat .  737. 749 (codified ns amended at 1 5  U.S.C.  
§ 77z-2 (Supp. I 1 996). inserting new section 27A into the Securities Act of 1 933 with safe 
harbor for forward-looking statemen ts) .  
I GK There. the application o f  fiduciary rules of ca re and loyalty has resulted in the evolu­
tion of a process standard.  B oards are not required to bring back some minimum price for 
the company for the shareholders' benefit.  B ut they are told to adhere to a process stan­
dard. in turn, designed to provide a circumstantial guarantee that they keep their eyes fixed 
on the objective of shareholder value enhancement. 
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odic, documented confirmation that reinvested funds are devoted 
only to r > k projects? To what extent do management-instituted 
decision systems respect the integrity of capital budgeting method­
ologies? Are the results of such analyses included in board 
presentations of business plans? Do boards make dividend and re­
investment decisions independently of one another? Presumably, 
answers to these questions could be obtained through the 
mandatory disclosure system. 
Stepped up disclosure rules have been suggested in l egal liter­
ature as a device for delimiting management discretion over the 
dividend. But ,  in making this argument, Victor Brudney rej ected a 
requirement of detailed disclosure of the components underlying 
each dividend decision-"a dubious benefit, and at a likely intoler­
able cost. " 1 69 He instead recommended that alterations in a longer 
term payout pattern be announced and explained. He sought, by 
reference to the signalling l iterature , to deploy the disclosure man­
date to clear up the ambiguities that attend departure from (or ad­
herence to) the conventional payout pattern. 1 70 He acknowledged 
that his proposed disclosure rule might also constrain manage­
ment's self-interested tendencies respecting reinvestment, but only 
as an incidental benefit. 1 7 1 
Subsequent economic literature , particularly the agency expla­
nation of the dividend payout pattern, suggests that the gravamen 
of any disclosure problem lies on the reinvestment side of the coin. 
Indeed, Joseph Stiglitz recently suggested just such an extension of 
the mandate. 1 72 And, certainly, if a disclosure mandate could be 
shaped that would discourage r < k investing without imposing an 
undue cost or litigation exposure burden on reporting firms ,  then 
such a mandate should be implemented. The question, then, is 
technical. 
Let us consider a few types of disclosure rules that could ad­
dress the problem, none of which would entail direct disclosure of 
investment projections. One type would require firms to report on 
their general policy respecting reinvestment decisions .  They could 
s tate, for example , whether r < k investing is a conscious practice; 
they could state whether a cost-benetl.t analysis keyed to projected 
return and the cost of capital is an invariant requirement respecting 
WJ Brudney. supra note 32.  at 1 1 6- 1 7 . 
1 70 He placed primary emphasis on the dividend decision's apparen t capacity to inllu­
encc the s tock price. i ndependent of  the re investment decision. See id. a t  1 1 7-22.  
1 7 1 See id. a t  122. 
1 72 See EJlin & S tigl itz. supra note 1 1 1 . a t  1309. 
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capital investment decisions, and could state also whether particu­
lars respecting such analyses are reported and discussed at the 
board level; and they could report on their capital budgeting meth­
odologies and prevailing assumptions respecting the cost of equity 
capital . The problem is that any such talk still is cheap. Even with 
state of the art capital budgeting methodology and board level re­
porting, r < k investment can remain a habit so long as the system 
provides an input of inflated proj ected returns . 
In the alternative (or in addition) , a second strategy could be 
employed.  Firms could be required, in accordance with Stiglitz ' s  
suggestion, to  identify the  different investment projects adopted 
and funded in a given period and state the amount invested. Stig­
litz argues that this requirement would ameliorate a problem of 
perverse incentives-rational managers will invest in suboptimal 
projects where their success or failure is likely to be obscured by 
the property of unobservability. 173 The problem with his sugges­
tion lies in the cost of creation and implementation. After all ,  it 
contemplates a whole new reporting system. 
If suboptimal investment practice really is a serious problem, 
then the cost-benefit question respecting these suggestions (or 
other disclosure strategies that might be brought forward) remains 
open. One anticipates the objection that additional disclosure re­
quirements amount to a deadweight cost. But that shopworn point 
dates from the era when managers were subject to an active control 
market deterrent. It lost vitality when the disciplinary equilibrium 
of the securities and control markets shifted radically in the late 
1980s. The better contra argument today is that disclosure 
problems should be treated with contractual solutions rather than 
with government mandates. Disclosure rules are , after all , con­
tractible to some extent, and contractual commitments in theory 
present a superior alternative to state mandates. Unfortunately, 
however, practices of institutional investor intervention have not 
yet evolved to the point of active exploration of the corporate char­
ter's potential to contain more productive terms for contractible 
subject matter. As noted above , 174 state law erects a barrier to any 
such development. Accordingly, a regulatory inquiry into the fea­
sibility of disclosure conventions that import greater transparency 
respecting dividend and investment policy would by i tself be wel­
come, if only because it could prompt private sector movement in 
this d irection. 
1 73 See irl. at 1 3 0 1 -02, 1 307,  1 309. 
1 74 See supra text accompanying note 1 6 1. 
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CoNCLUSION 
If divid�nds are a puzzle  because good firms pay them despite 
the availability of exceptional investment opportunities, then War­
ren Buffett is our only rational corporate manager because his pur­
suit of exceptionally good investments leads him to withhold 
dividends entirely. But, without any diminution in our recognition 
of his achievements, we can go some distance in solving the divi­
dend puzzle by reference to the economics of noncontractibility. 
The solution of course is that there is no neat solution, due to a 
confluence of present information asymmetries, imperfect incen­
tives, and future uncertainties that surround every dividend deci­
sion. We accordingly should reconceive dividend policy to be less a 
puzzle than a complex phenomenon observed among actors deal­
ing with one another in a second-best world. Thus reconceived, 
dividend policy admits of a complex explanation, each component 
of which is unsatisfactory but the entirety of which provides a satis­
factory working picture. The models applied in this Article add 
much detail to that working picture without suggesting any radical 
revision of its basic outlines. As such, they reconfirm the standing 
view that the dividend is a territory unsuited to the imposition of 
new legal mandates, even a mandate transferring declaration au­
thority over to the shareholders. Only as to disclosure pol icy might 
we plausibly explore productive l aw reform initiatives. Meanwhile,  
shareholders themselves, led by activist investment institutions, 
have found ways to make suboptimal earnings retention a less 
likely event, if not to guarantee against it. An empirical question 
arises respecting the extent of their success. Has the management 
climate of the 1990s so changed as to make suboptimal earnings 
retention a secondary problem on the corporate landscape? One 
suspects that once data are on the table for inspection, the answer 
still will lie in the judgment of the observer. 
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APPENDIX 
In the first quarter of 1996, Berkshire Hathaway held signifi­
cant stakes in the fol lowing publicly-traded companies:  American 
Express, Walt Disney, Coca-Cola, Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corp . ,  GEICO, Gillette, Wells Fargo & Co. ,  and Salomon Broth­
ersY5 The chart1 76 that follows shows the dividends per share and 
earnings per share for each of these holdings along with those of 
companies in the Fortune 500 that fall into the same industry group 
for each of 1994 and 1995. For each company, a "payout ratio" is 
calculated in terms of dividends as a percentage of earnings . In 
addition the mean "payout ratio" is calculated for each industry 
group. 
The payout ratios of the Berkshire-held companies and the in­
dustry groups compare as follows: 
Coca-Cola 
B everages 
Salomon Bros 
B rokerage 
Gillette 
Metals 
Wells Fargo 
B anks 
Am ex 
FHLM 
Div. Fin. 
Disney 
Ent. 
GEICO 
Insurance 
1995 1 994 
37.29 % 39.3 9 %  
53.62 % 5 1 . 93 %  
1 8.29 % -14.85 % 
34.79% 38.26 % 
32.43 % 3 1 .85 % 
10 .5 5 %  26.01 % 
23. 1 2 %  27.74 % 
45.79 % 41 .45 % 
28.94 % 3 1 .64 %  
2 1 .09 % 1 7 .93 % 
26.24% 28.61 % 
1 3 .46 % 14.22 % 
-7.56 % -6.98% 
36.36% 2 6 . 1 1 %  
1 7 . 85 %  14 .8  
(loss ;  dividend paid) 
(due to Time Warner losses) 
1 75 See B E R KS H I R E HATHAW;\Y It'c.. 1 995 A NNUAL REPORT 1 5 - 1 6  ( 1 996). As of De­
cember 3 1 . 1 995. the Walt Disney hold ing was in  the  form of  a long-term stake i n  Capital 
Cit ies/A BC Effective as of January 1 996. Capital Cities merged with Wal t  Disney. Pursu­
ant to the merger. Capital Cities shares were converted into Wal t  D isney shares. A lso. in 
1 996 Berkshire purchased the remaining 49 'Yo of  GElCO to make it a 100% owned 
subsidiary. 
! 76 The chart was compiled from the fol lowing sources: The Fortune 1 000 Ranked Withi11 
Industry. foRTUNE. Apr. 29. 1 996, at  F-43-f-64; Company Ticker Symbol and All Share 
I n formation. Bloomberg On-Line financial Services, Sept .  20. 1 996. 
� 
T I C K E R  1 995 PAYO UT 1 994 PAYO UT 
_p.. ---.j 
COMPA N Y  N A M E  S Y M B O L  D PS E P S  R AT I O  D PS E PS R AT I O  
0 
B E V E RAGES (7) 
Coca-Cola KO $0.44 $ 1. 1 8 37.29% $0.39 $0.99 39.39% 
A n h e u se r- B u s c h  B U D  $0.84 $1 .25 67.20 % $0.74 $1 .94 38. 1 4 %  
Coca-Cola E n terpri ses CCE $0.50 $0.62 80.65 % $0.50 $0.52 96. 1 5 %  
Wh i t man W H  $0.37 $ 1. 26 29.37 % $0.33 $0.97 34.02 %  
Q 
AV E RA G E  $0.54 $ 1 .08 53 .62 % $0.49 $ 1.:1 1 5 1 .93 %  >:1 
t::J 
B RO K E R A G E  (7) a N 
M errill  Lyn c h  M E R  $ 1 .0 1  $5 .42 1 8.63 %  $0.89 $4.74 1 8.78% a 
Lehman B ros L E H  $0.20 $ 1 .76 1 1 .36% $0. 1 8  $0.69 26.09% t--< 
S a l om o n  B ros S B  $0.64 $3.50 1 8.29% $0.64 ($4.3 1 )  -1 4.85% � � Paine Webber PWJ $0.48 $0.52 92.3 1 %  $0.58 $0.41 1 4 1 .46% >:1 
B e a r  S tearns B S C  $0.54 $ 1 .62 33.33 % $0.52 $2.62 1 9.85 % tr-1 
AV E RAG E $0.57 $2.56 34.79% $0.56 $0.83 38.26% :s 
tr-1 
M ETA L P RO D U CTS ( 1 6) 
� 
Gil let te  G $0.60 $ 1 .85 32.43 % $0.50 $ 1 .57 3 1 .85 %  
Crown Co rk & Seal  CCK $0.00 $0.83 0.00% $0.00 $ 1 .47 0.00% 
MAS CO M A S  $0.73 ($2.77) -26.35 % $0.69 $ 1 . 22 56.56% � Tyco I n te rn ational  TYC **$0.20 $ 1 .4 1  1 4 . 1 8 %  $0.20 $ 1 .28 15 .63 %  -
I l l i nois Tool  Works I TW $0.64 $3.29 1 9.45 % $0.54 $2.45 22.04% !----" \0 
U . S .  I n cl u s t  r ies  USN N/A* N/A N/A N/A* N/A N/A :::;. 
S t a n l e y  Works S W K  $0. 7 1  $0.67 1 05.97% $0.69 $ 1 .40 49.29% 
0 \0 
B a l l  B LL $0.60 ($0.72) -83.33 % $0.60 $2.20 27.27 % 
,_... 
\0 
Newel l  N W L  $0.46 $ 1 .4 1  32.62 %  $0.39 $ 1 .24 3 1 .45 % 
\0 -....] ......... 
TOTA L AV E RAG E $0.44 $0.66 10 .55 % $0.40 $ 1 .43 26.01 % 
AV E RAG E W/O U T  U NAVA I LA B L E S  (* ) $0.49 $0.75 1 1 .87 % $0.45 $ 1 .60 29.26 % 
* *  J U N E  F I SCAL Y E A R  E N D S  
COM M E RC I A L  BAN KS (55)  
C i t i corp CCI $1 .20 $6.48 1 8.52 % $0.45 $6.29 7 . 1 5 %  
B a n ka merica BAC $ 1 .84 $6.45 28.53 % $ 1 .60 $5 .33 30.02% 
N a tions B a n k  N B  $2.08 $7.04 29.55 % $ 1 .88 $6.06 3 1 .02% 
C h e m ical  C H L  $1. 88 $6.47 29.06 % $ 1 .58 $4.54 34.80 % 
J . P .  M o rgan J P M  $3.00 $6.36 47. 1 7 %  $2.72 $6.02 45 . 1 8 %  b 
Ch ase M a n h a t t a n  C M B  $ 1 . 88 $6.04 3 1 . 1 3 %  $ 1 .58 $4.97 31 .79% ........ 
First Chi cago N B D  FCN $ 1 .32 $3.41 38.71 % $ 1 . 1 7  $3.58 32.68% :s 
Fi rst U n i o n  Corp. FTU $ 1 .96 $5.04 38.89 % $ 1 .72 $4.58 37.55 % b 
B a n e  O n e  O N E  $ 1 .21 $2.9 1  41 .58 % $ 1 .09 $2.20 49.55 % t'l'1 
B a n kers Tr u st BT $4.00 $2.03 1 97.04% $3.60 $7 . 1 7  50.21 %  6 
Fl eet  Fi n a n c i a l  FLT $ 1 .60 $1 .57 1 01 .91 % $ 1 .30 $3.09 42.07% V") 
N orwest N O B  $0.90 $2.73 32 .97 % $0.77 $2.41 3 1 .95 % 
PN C B a n k  P N C  $ 1 .40 $ 1 . 1 9  1 1 7 .65 % $ 1 .3 1  $2.52 5 1 .98% 
Keycorp K E Y  $ 1 .44 $3.45 41 .74 % $ 1 .28 $3.45 37 . 1 0 %  
B a n k  o f  B oston B K B  $ 1 .29 $4.43 29 . 1 2 %  $0.93 $3.61 25 .76% 
Wel l s  Far go WFC $4.60 $ 1 9.90 23 . 1 2 %  $4.00 $ 1 4.42 27.74 % 
B a n k  o f  N e w  Yo rk B K  $0.68 $2. 1 5  3 1 .63 % $0.53 $ 1 .85 28.65 % 
Fi rst I n te rstate  B ancorp I $3 . 10 $ 1 1 .02 28. 1 3 %  $2.75 $2. 3 1  1 1 9.05 % 
M e l l o n  B a n k  M E L  $2.00 $4.46 44.84 % $ 1 .56 $2.42 64.46 % 
Wac h o v i a  W B  $ 1 .38 $3 .49 39.54% $ 1 .23 $3 . 1 2  39.42 % 
S u n trust B a n k s  STI $0.74 $2.47 29.96 % $0.66 $2. 1 8  30.28 % 
B a rn e t t  B a n k s  B B I  $0.88 $2.57 34.24 % $0.77 $2.33 33.05 % +>-
N a t i o n a l  City N CC $ 1 .30 $2.95 44.07 % $1. 18  $2.70 43.70% 
-....] 
,_... 
' ·''i'·-.. , '
1 
First  B a n k  System F B S  $ 1 .45 $4. 1 1  35 .28% $ 1 . 1 6  $2. 1 4  54.2 1 %  
� --...) 
Com erica C M A  $ 1 .34 $3.52 38.07 % $ 1 .20 $3.28 36.59% 
N 
B oatme n ' s  B a n cs hares B OAT $ 1 . 39 $3.25 42.77 % $ 1 .25 $3 . 1 7  39.43 % 
U . S .  B an corp U S B C  $ 1 .03 $2.09 49.28 % $0.91 $ 1 .60 56.88% 
Co rest at es CFL $ 1 .36 $3. 1 8  42.77% $ 1 .20 $ 1 .72 69.77% 
R e p u b l i c  New York R N B  $ 1 .44 $4.59 3 1 .37% $ 1 .26 $5 .61  22.46 % 
M B NA K R B  $0.54 $ 1 .54 35 .06% $0.46 $ 1 . 1 8  38.98% 
TOTA L AVE RAG E $ 1 .67 $4.56 45 .79% $ 1 .44 $3.86 41 .45 % 
Q 
D IV E R S I F I E D  FINANCIA L  ( 15 )  ::::0 
Fed .  N a t ' !  M ortgage A ssoc. F N M  $0.68 $1 .95 34.87 % $0.60 $ 1 .94 30.93 % tJ () 
American Express AXP $0.90 $3. 1 1  28.94 % $0.87 $2.75 3 1 .64 % N 
M organ Stan l ey Group M G M S  $0.48 $3.33 14 .41 % $0.60 $2.09 28.7 1 % () 
Fed .  H om e  Loan Mortgage F R E  $ 1 .20 $5.69 2 1 .09% $ 1 .04 $5.80 1 7.93 % l""< 
D ean Witter  DWD $0. 6 1  $4.88 12 .50% $0.48 $4.27 1 1.24% � 
American G e n e ra l  A G C  $ 1 .24 $2.64 46.97 % $ 1 . 1 6  $2.45 47.35% � 
H o usehold I n t e rn a t i o nal  H I  $ 1 .29 $4.30 30.00 % $ 1 .2 1  $3 .50 34.57% ::::0 
B erksh i re H at h away B R K  $(l .00 $61 0.90 0.00% $0.00 $420. 1 2  0.00 % � 
:s S t ud e n t  Loa n Mktg.  Assoc. S L M  $ 1 . 5 1  $7.20 20.97 % $ 1 .40 $4.9 1  28.51 %  � 
M arch & M c Le n n a n  M M C  $2.9 1 $5.53 52.62 % $2.79 $5 .05 55.25 % � 
TOTA L AV ERAGE $ 1. 08 $64.95 26 .24 'Yo $ 1 .02 $45.29 28.61 % 
E N T E R'T'A I N M ENT (4) 
Wall  D i s n e y  D I S  $0.35 $2.60 1 3 .46% $0.29 $2.04 1 4.22% 
� Via com V I A  $0.00 $0.43 0.00% $0.00 $0.07 0.00% ........ 
Tim e - Warner TWX $0.36 ($0.57) -63 . 1 6 %  $0.35 ($0.27) -1 29.63 % I-' 
Turn e r  B roadcast i n g  TBS $0.07 $0.36 1 9 .44 % $0.07 $0.08 87.50% \0 
� 
AV E R AG E $0.20 $0.71 -7.56% $0. 1 8  $0.48 -6.98% 0 \0 
I N S U R A N C E ,  P&C,  STO CK (27) 
A me r i ca n  I n t ' l  G ro u p  A I G  $0.32 $5.30 
A l l s ta te A L L  $0.78 $4.22 
Loews LTR $0.62 $ 14.98 
Travelers G ro u p  T RY $0.54 $3.67 
ITT H a rtford G ro u p  H I G  $0.00 $4.77 
G eneral  R E  G R N  $ 1 .96 $9.92 
C h u b b  C B  $0.98 $3 .92 
St .  P a u l  Cos. SPC $1.58 $5.68 
S a reco S A FC $ 1 .02 $3 . 1 5  
A m erican Fi n .  G ro u p  A F G  $0.75 $3.88 
U S F& G  F G  $0.20 $ 1 .53 
A l l m e rica Fi n a n c i a l  AFC $0.00 $2.61 
G E ICO G E C  $ 1 .08 $2.97 
P rogressive P G R  $0.22 $3 .24 
R e l i a n ce G ro u p  H o l d i ngs R E L  $0.32 $0.73 
AV E R AG E  $0.69 $4.70 
6.04% $0.28 $4.58 
1 8.48% $0.72 $ 1. 08 
4 . 14% $0.50 $2.22 
14.7 1 % $0.43 $2.57 
0.00 % $0.00 $5.50 
19.76% $ 1 .92 $7.97 
25 .00 % $0.90 $2.97 
27.82 % $ 1 .49 $4.93 
32.38% $0.95 $2.48 
1 9 .33 % $ 1.1 6 ($0.83) 
1 3 .07 % $0.20 $ 1 .77 
0.00% $0.00 $0.76 
36.36% $ 1.00 $3 .83 
6.79 % $0.21 $3 .59 
43.84% $0.32 $0.38 
17 .85 % $0.67 $2.92 
6. 1 1 %  
66.67% 
22.52% 
1 6.73 % 
0.00% 
24.09% 
30.30% 
30.22 % 
38.3 1 %  
-1 39.76% 
1 1 .30% 
0.00% 
26. 1 1 %  
5 .85% 
84.2 1 % 
1 4.84% 
f-.-" 
\0 \0 --....) 
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